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HIS Survey period reflected a noted shift the willingness of TexasTSupreme Court to correct both substantive and procedural errors.
This shift is perhaps most obvious in the mandamus arena, where
the appellate courts collectively granted mandamus relief in more than
half of the surveyed cases, and even granted mandamus review of a trial
court's interlocutory interpretation of a contract because that ruling "se-
verely compromised" a party's case.' The supreme court also granted
review to address conflicts among Texas appellate courts on the proper
standards of review in numerous substantive areas, including rulings on
personal jurisdiction, 2 termination of parental rights,3 and primary juris-
diction.4 The supreme court further appears increasingly willing to find
conflicts jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals. 5 However, it is impor-
tant to note that the supreme court has undergone substantial changes in
the last year. Several justices retired or otherwise decided not to run for
reelection. As a result, one-third of the current justices on the supreme
court were not sitting on the court during this Survey period. Only time
will tell if the new supreme court will continue this trend toward error
correction.
* B.A., with high honors, University of Texas at Austin; M.P.A., University of Texas
at Austin; J.D., with honors, University of Texas at Austin; Partner, Haynes and Boone,
LLP, Dallas, Texas.
** B.G.S., University of Texas at Arlington; J.D. cum laude, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity; Shareholder, Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., with honors, Austin College; J.D. cum laude, Tulane University; Partner,
Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, Texas.
**** B.A., summa cum laude, Stephen F. Austin University; J.D., magna cum laude,
Baylor University; Associate, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, Texas.
1. See, e.g., In re Allstate, 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002).
2. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793-94 (Tex. 2002).
3. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002).
4. See Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 222 (Tex.
2002).
5. See Schein v. Stromboe, No. 00-1162, 2002 WL 31426407 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2002);
Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002); Texas
Dept. of Transp. v. Garza, 70 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2002).
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II. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS
During this Survey period, Texas courts granted mandamus relief in
sixty-five percent of all mandamus cases surveyed. In many instances re-
lief was granted without even addressing whether the cases met the stan-
dards for mandamus review.
1. Mandamus Jurisdiction
The Texas Supreme Court's mandamus jurisdiction is governed by sec-
tion 22.002(a) of the Texas Government Code, which provides that the
supreme court can issue writs of mandamus "against a district judge, a
court of appeals or a justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state
government except the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or a judge
of the court of criminal appeals. ' 6 Despite the overwhelming number of
cases where mandamus relief was granted during this Survey period, the
courts continued to take heed of the jurisdictional limitations on their
powers over entities not expressly identified in section 22.002(a).
In the case of In re TXU Electric Co., TXU sought to compel the Public
Utility Commission ("PUC") to rescind orders requiring TXU to reverse
efforts to mitigate its estimated stranded costs. 7 TXU argued that such
action was necessary to "preserve the integrity of the Legislature's plan
for deregulation." In a per curiam opinion, a divided Texas Supreme
Court refused to grant mandamus relief, and several justices filed concur-
ring and dissenting opinions addressing the threshold issue of whether the
supreme court had jurisdiction to issue mandamus against the three-
member panel of PUC commissioners. 9
Justice Baker, joined by Justice Rodriguez, concluded that section
22.002(a)'s grant of jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus against "an
officer of state government" did not authorize the court to mandamus the
PUC. 10 Justice Baker concluded that this language extended only to indi-
vidual state officers and not to a commission or board of officers." Be-
cause the Public Utilities Regulatory Act authorizes the three-member
commission to act only as an entity, the concurrence concluded that the
Court did not have original mandamus jurisdiction over the PUC and
should dismiss TXU's petition for lack of jurisdiction.' 2
Justice Phillips, joined by Justices Enoch and Godbey (sitting by assign-
ment), concluded that the court had jurisdiction, but held that TXU could
not prove that relief was unavailable in the district court, in which TXU
6. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
7. See In re TXU Elec. Co., 67 S.W.3d 130, 131 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
8. Id. at 134-35 (Phillips, C.J., concurring).
9. Id. at 131 (per curiam).
10. Id. at 137-38 (Baker, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 138 (Baker, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 139 (Baker, J., concurring).
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had sought similar relief.13 Justice Phillips reasoned that the supreme
court's mandamus authority was "not a general, supervisory power" and
that irreparable harm would not befall TXU absent supreme court
intervention. 14
Justice Hecht, joined by Justices Owen and Jefferson, filed a dissenting
opinion in TXU arguing that the supreme court had jurisdiction to man-
damus the individual members of the PUC, that there was no adequate
remedy, and that mandamus relief should have been granted.15 The final
opinion in TXU was authored by Justice Brister (also sitting by assign-
ment), who agreed with Justice Hecht that there was no adequate legal
remedy but would have found that the PUC did not abuse its discretion
or violate a duty imposed by law.16
The courts of appeals mandamus jurisdiction is governed by Section
22.221(b) of the Texas Government Code, which gives courts of appeals
authority to issue writs of mandamus against "a judge of a district or
county court in the court of appeals district."'17 In the case of In re Da-
vis, 18 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that it had no mandamus ju-
risdiction over a case that had been transferred from Harris County
seeking the issuance of a writ against a Harris County judge.
The legislature has also provided Texas trial courts with mandamus ju-
risdiction over certain types of rulings. Specifically, under the Texas Pub-
lic Information Act, Texas trial courts have the authority to issue writs of
mandamus in three circumstances: (1) where a governmental body ref-
uses to request an attorney general's decision on whether information is
public; (2) where a governmental body refuses to supply public informa-
tion; and (3) where a governing body refuses to supply information that
the attorney general has determined is public information not excepted
from disclosure. 19 In Thomas v. Cornyn, the Austin Court of Appeals
held that the Houston Chronicle was entitled to request mandamus relief
from the trial court where a sheriff refused to supply certain reports
deemed public under the Public Information Act and basic information
determined to be public by the attorney general in previous rulings.20
To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must have a justiciable
interest in the underlying controversy. 21 However, a relator need not be
a party to the underlying litigation or proceedings in order to seek man-
13. Id. at 132-36 (Phillips, C.J., concurring).
14. Id. at 135 (Phillips, C.J., concurring).
15. Id. at 150-71 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 145-50 (Brister, J., concurring).
17. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.221(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
18. In re Davis, 87 S.W.3d 794, 795 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
19. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.321 (Vernon Supp. 2003); City of Garland v. Dallas
Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex. 2000).
20. Thomas v. Cornyn, 71 S.W.3d 473, 481-82 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, orig.
proceeding).




damus relief.22 In another case involving the Houston Chronicle, the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the Chronicle, as a non-party,
properly sought mandamus relief because it had a justicable interest in a
trial court's gag order restraining counsel, defendants, and witnesses from
making extrajudicial statements to the media regarding a pending high-
profile criminal prosecution. 23
2. Adequate Remedy by Law
A writ of mandamus will issue "when there is no other adequate rem-
edy by law."'24 In the case of In re Allstate,25 the supreme court held that
a trial court's ruling declaring a contract provision unenforceable could be
remedied by mandamus. Allstate involved a provision in standard per-
sonal automobile insurance policies imposing a costly appraisal review
process on insured individuals. In ruling on the insurance company's
"motion to invoke appraisal," the trial court determined that the ap-
praisal provision in the personal automobile insurance policy was unen-
forceable on public policy grounds.26 The supreme court concluded that
the trial court's interpretation was an abuse of discretion, and, because
the ruling would have vitiated the relators' ability to defend the plaintiffs'
breach of contract claim, mandamus relief was proper. 27
3. Mandamus Over Particular Orders
a. Discovery Rulings
There are at least three situations in the discovery context when man-
damus is proper because an appeal is not an adequate remedy. 28 First,
when a trial court erroneously orders the disclosure of privileged infor-
mation, mandamus will issue to prevent compulsory disclosure. 29 For ex-
ample, mandamus is the proper remedy when the trial court improperly
denies a motion to quash the depositions of persons who are entitled to
legislative immunity.30 Mandamus will also issue when a party's request
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. In re Allstate, 85 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. 2002) (Baker, J., dissenting); but see In re
Koehn, 86 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, orig. proceeding) (issuing mandamus
to compel the trial court to order severance of lawsuit into two actions without analyzing
whether relator had an adequate legal remedy); In re Bradle, 83 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2002, orig. proceeding) (issuing mandamus where trial court's order requiring a
separate trial on punitive damages to be heard by a new jury constituted a "clear failure ...
to analyze and apply the law correctly," without analyzing whether relator had an adequate
legal remedy).
25. Allstate, 85 S.W.3d at 196.
26. Id. at 195.
27. Id. at 196.
28. See In re Family Hospice, Ltd., 62 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, orig.
proceeding).
29. Id.; In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2002).
30. See Perry, 60 S.W.3d at 862 (trial court improperly denied a motion to quash the
depositions of Legislative Redistricting Board members, concluding such members were
cloaked with evidentiary and testimonial privileges under the doctrine of legislative
immunity).
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for discovery is overly' broad and is not reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. 31
Second, mandamus is proper when the trial court disallows discovery,
and the missing discovery cannot be made part of an appellate record,
thereby precluding appellate review. 32
Third, when a party's ability to present a viable claim or defense is
vitiated or severely compromised, appellate remedies may be inade-
quate.33 In the case of In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., the supreme court
granted mandamus relief from the trial court's orders abating almost all
of the discovery in a mass toxic-tort suit to allow plaintiffs to try certain
"test claims" first. 34 The supreme court reasoned that relators' defenses
were severely compromised because they were precluded from obtaining
basic information from 3,265 plaintiffs until after the claims of the initial
trial group were resolved, and that, without such evidence, "memories
fade with time," "evidence may be lost or corrupted," and "documents
may be destroyed in compliance with document retention programs. '35
The supreme court noted, most importantly, that there were four differ-
ent pipelines with different toxic substances involved, and without discov-
ery of basic information, relators would have been forced to defend
themselves against claims that may not have involved substances con-
tained in their own pipelines.36
Another situation in which mandamus is proper, because a party's
claim or defense is severely compromised by a trial court's discovery rul-
ing, is when a trial court improperly imposes death penalty sanctions
against a party for discovery abuses. 37
However, mandamus is not proper, and an appeal is an adequate rem-
edy, when the trial court improperly grants an extension of time to file an
expert report relating to a health care liability claim under article 4590i,
section 13.01(g) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. 38
31. See In re American Home Assurance Co., 88 S.W.3d 370, 376-77 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2002, orig. proceeding) (order compelling, among other things, the production
of information on insurance reserves was overly broad); In re United Servs. Auto. Assoc.,
76 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding) (order compelling
production of unredacted reports prepared for non-party insurance companies was overly
broad); but see In re Senior Living Props., L.L.C., 63 S.W.3d 594, 597-98 (Tex. App.-Tyler
2002, orig. proceeding) (order that compelled the deposition of a nursing home representa-
tive on issues of insurance coverage but that did not compel disclosure of individual settle-
ments was not overly broad); In re Shipmon, 68 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2002, orig. proceeding) (order compelling production of documents and records without
time limitation was overly broad).
32. See Family Hospice Ltd., 62 S.W.3d at 316.
33. Id. at 316-17 (granting mandamus relief when the trial court improperly refused to
compel disclosure of non-privileged documents).
34. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d 197, 200-01 (Tex. 2001).
35. Id. at 199.
36. Id.
37. See In re Harvest Cmtys. of Houston, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding); In re U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding); In re Polaris Indus., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 746, 754-56 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2001, orig. proceeding).
38. See In re Morris, 93 S.W.3d 388, 389 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, orig. proceeding).
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b. Orders Entered Without Jurisdiction
Ordinarily, complaints of improper jurisdiction can be remedied by di-
rect appeal. 39 However, mandamus relief is appropriate when one court
interferes with another court's jurisdiction.40 For example, section 5B of
the Texas Probate Code authorizes a statutory probate court to transfer
claims to itself from a district court when the claims are "appertaining to
or incident to an estate pending in the statutory probate court. '41 In the
case of In re Swepi, the Texas Supreme Court held that the statutory pro-
bate court's transfer order failed to meet the standard established by sec-
tion 5B and granted mandamus relief, compelling the transfer of the case
back to district court.4 2
Mandamus relief is also available when jurisdictional claims raise issues
of sovereign immunity and comity.4 3 In the case of In re China Oil,44 the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in exercising jurisdiction over a suit brought against a foreign sover-
eign, despite a claim of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. Also, in a case involving a dispute over whether the trial
court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over a child custody matter
after the child had moved to another state, the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals held that mandamus will issue even if there is an adequate remedy
by appeal.4 5
Finally, mandamus will lie when a judgment is void due to lack of juris-
diction.4 6 In such an instance, it is unnecessary for the relator to pursue
other remedies even if they exist.4 7
c. Venue Rulings
Under section 1.5.0642 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
39. See In re McCormick, 87 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, orig. pro-
ceeding) (citing Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Walker, 787 S.W.2d 954, 954-55 (Tex.
1990)); In re State of Texas, 65 S.W.3d 383, 387-88 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, orig. proceed-
ing) (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue orders during the administra-
tive phase of an eminent domain proceeding under the Texas Property Code, but refusing
to grant relief because the State had an adequate remedy by appealing the administrative
award to the county court at law).
40. See In re Swepi, L.P., 85 S.W.3d 800, 809 (Tex. 2002); see also In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d
297, 302-04 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to
remedy an improper ruling on a dominant jurisdiction claim).
41. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5B (Vernon 2003).
42. Swepi, 85 S.W.3d at 808-09.
43. In re China Oil & Gas Pipeline Bureau, 94 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, orig. proceeding).
44. Id. at *34.
45. McCormick, 87 S.W.3d at 749 (finding no clear abuse of discretion in retaining
jurisdiction over child custody case).
46. See In re Luster, 77 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, orig.
proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not have plenary power to vacate or "ungrant"
an order granting a new trial, that the amended judgment was void, and that mandamus
was the proper remedy).
47. Id.
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mandamus will issue to enforce a mandatory venue statute.48 In the case
of In re Pepsico, Inc., the relator sought mandamus relief from the trial
court's order striking relator's mandatory venue argument contained in
an amended motion to transfer venue.49 Real parties in interest argued
that mandamus was not the proper remedy because the trial court's rul-
ing, based on waiver, was reviewable on appeal.5 0 The Texarkana Court
of Appeals disagreed, concluding that mandamus was proper because
"the real nature of [relator's] petition for mandamus is an effort to en-
force a mandatory venue statute."'5 1 Thus, the court of appeals concluded
that mandamus was available to remedy the trial court's abuse of discre-
tion.52  Because the mandatory venue argument contained in the
amended motion related back to the original motion to transfer venue,
the court of appeals granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court
to reinstate the amended motion to transfer venue and to consider its
allegations in determining venue. 53
d. Rulings Relating to Temporary Restraining Orders
In the case of In re Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commis-
sion,54 the Texas Supreme Court held, as a matter of first impression, that
mandamus was available to remedy a temporary restraining order that
violated time limitations set forth in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 680.55
While a temporary restraining order is generally not appealable, a tempo-
rary injunction is an appealable interlocutory order.5 6 The supreme court
concluded that the trial court's improper extension of the time limit for
the temporary restraining order beyond Rule 680's fourteen-day deadline
did not convert the temporary restraining order into an appealable tem-
porary injunction.57 Thus, because there was no adequate remedy by ap-
peal, mandamus was available. 58
48. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642 (Vernon 2002).
49. In re Pepsico, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 787, 788 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, orig. proceed-
ing). In Pepsico, the relator filed a motion to transfer venue concurrently with its answer
asserting, in part, that venue should be transferred under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86(governing mandatory venue). Id. at 789; TEX. R. Civ. P. 86. Relator later filed an
amended motion to transfer venue arguing that venue was proper in another county under
a specific mandatory venue statute. Pepsico, 87 S.W.3d at 789. The trial court refused to
consider the mandatory venue argument, reasoning that relator had waived that argument
by failing to raise it before or contemporaneously with its answer. Id.
50. Id. at 789.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Pepsico, 87 S.W.3d at 793-94.
54. In re Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n ("TNRCC"), 85 S.W.3d 201, 206
(Tex. 2002).
55. Rule 680 provides that "[ejvery temporary restraining order granted without no-
tice ... shall expire by its terms within such time after signing, not to exceed fourteen days,
as the court fixes." TEX. R. Civ. P. 680. The trial court's order extended the TRO by
forty-two days without relator's consent. TNRCC, 85 S.W.3d at 202-03.






Void orders are reviewable by mandamus.59 If a trial court "fails to
observe a mandatory statutory provision conferring a right or forbidding
a particular action," that action may sometimes be declared void.60 If the
challenged order is void, the relator need not show that it lacks an ade-
quate appellate remedy.61
f. Orders Regarding Arbitration
A party seeking to compel arbitration by mandamus must establish
both (1) the existence of an arbitration agreement subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) and (2) that the claim at issue falls within the
scope of the arbitration agreement. 62 In the case of In re J.D. Edwards,
the parties disputed whether the plaintiff's fraudulent inducement claim
fell within the scope of an arbitration agreement that compelled arbitra-
tion of disputes "involving" a licensing agreement. 63 The Texas Supreme
Court concluded that, even though the claim was based on pre-contract
conduct, whether the contract between the parties was induced by fraud
was a dispute "involving" the licensing agreement. 64 The trial court
therefore abused its discretion in denying the motion to compel as to the
fraudulent concealment claim.65 Moreover, the court held that the licens-
ing agreement's reference to the Uniform Arbitration Act did not invoke
the Texas Arbitration Act (under which there is an adequate remedy by
interlocutory appeal). 66 Thus, mandamus relief was granted.
In the case of In re EGL Global Logistics, L.P.,67 the First Court of
Appeals held that the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of equita-
ble estoppel to allow the defendant, who did not sign an arbitration
agreement, to compel arbitration. The court held that the plaintiff was
equitably estopped from resisting defendant's motion to compel arbitra-
tion because the plaintiff (who had signed an arbitration agreement with
related parties) raised allegations of "substantially interdependent and
concerted misconduct by both the non-signatories" and the signatories. 68
59. See In re Consol. Freightways, Inc., 75 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, orig. proceeding).
60. Id.
61. Id. (concluding that the statutory stay contained in TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
21.28-C § 17 is mandatory, that the trial court's order entered in violation of the stay was
void, and that mandamus would issue).
62. In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co., 87 S.W.3d 546, 549 (Tex. 2002).
63. Id. at 550-51.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 551.
67. In re EGL Global Logistics, L.P., 89 S.W.3d 761, 764-65 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, orig. proceeding).
68. Id. at 765.
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g. Judge's Refusal to Disqualify Himself
Mandamus will issue to compel a district judge to disqualify himself
from presiding over a child custody modification proceeding where the
judge's former law partner represented relator in an earlier divorce pro-
ceeding in which the same custody issues were adjudicated.69 Addition-
ally, any orders or judgments already rendered in the modification
proceeding were "void and without effect." 70
h. Orders Relating to Elections
This Survey period produced a number of mandamus decisions examin-
ing the limits to the general rule of strictly construing the Election Code.
In the case of In re Gamble,71 for example, the Texas Supreme Court held
that a candidate's fault in filing a defective election application does not
automatically preclude the courts from fashioning equitable relief. But
for the candidate's failure to pursue his entitlement to equitable relief to
a final decision on the merits, the supreme court would have found no
abuse of discretion by the court of appeals in issuing mandamus to allow
a post-deadline amendment to the election application so that the party
chair could place the candidate's name on the ballot.72
Four justices filed a concurring opinion in Gamble advocating a strict
construction of the Election Code. 73 They would have held that the Elec-
tion Code's rules and filing deadlines are absolute and that candidates
must be held accountable for properly completing and timely filing their
applications for a place on the ballot.
In the case of In re Phillips,74 the Austin Court of Appeals granted
Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Phillips' petition for writ of
mandamus seeking to compel the Texas Libertarian Party Chair to de-
clare its non-lawyer candidate ineligible for the office of Chief Justice.
4. Mandamus Procedures
Parties seeking mandamus relief must comply with Texas Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 52.3, which requires, among other things, that the rela-
tor (1) provide the court with a clear and concise argument with citations
to authority and the mandamus record, (2) verify all factual allegations
contained in the petition, and (3) attach an appendix to the petition con-
taining a certified or sworn copy of the document showing the matter
69. See In re O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. 2002).
70. Id.
71. In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. 2002).
72. Id. at 317-19. In re Elwell, No. 10-02-213-CV, 2002 WL 1808990, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Waco Aug. 7, 2002, orig. proceeding); In re Vera, 71 S.W.3d 819, 820-21 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding); In re Ducato, 66 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2002, orig. proceeding). Other courts have similarly granted or denied manda-
mus relief to compel the inclusion of various candidates' names on ballots despite the can-
didates' technical mistakes in filing their applications.
73. Gamble, 71 S.W.3d at 320-27 (Baker, J., concurring).
74. In re Phillips, 96 S.W.3d 418, 419 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, orig. proceeding).
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complained of.7 5 In In re Kuhler,76 the Amarillo Court of Appeals de-
nied mandamus relief where the relator's unverified petition merely
stated that, "based upon the facts of this case, due process was clearly
violated," without any substantive analysis. 77 In the case of In re
Pasadena Independent School District, the Amarillo Court of Appeals de-
nied mandamus relief where the relator failed to provide the court of
appeals with a complete reporter's record, which was required for a re-
view of the trial court's determinations of fact under a deferential stan-
dard of review. 78 And in In re Chavez, mandamus was denied where
relator failed to attach, via appendix or otherwise, the motion containing
petitioner's complaint.79
Moreover, although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance
is controlled by equitable principles.80 Thus, Texas courts can deny man-
damus relief based on delay alone. In In re East Texas Salt Water Dispo-,
sal Co., the Tyler Court of Appeals held that relator's request for
mandamus relief was barred by laches where relator waited ten years
before pursuing such relief from a trial court's repeated refusal to with-
draw relator's deemed admissions.81
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Conflicts Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
The Texas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in the absence of an ex-
press constitutional or legislative grant.82 As a general rule, jurisdiction
over interlocutory appeals is final in the courts of appeals. However, the
legislature created exceptions to this general rule for certain interlocutory
appeals, including those meeting the "conflicts jurisdiction" standards set
forth in section 22.001(a)(2) of the Government Code.83 Under this stan-
dard, the supreme court has "conflicts jurisdiction" over interlocutory ap-
peals when "one of the courts of appeals holds differently from a prior
decision of another court of appeals or of the supreme court on a ques-
75. TEX. R. App. P. 52.3(h), (j).
76. In re Kuhler, 60 S.W.3d 381, 384-85 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding).
77. The court further noted that it might have overlooked relator's lack of verification
if the court could have verified the accuracy of the relator's factual allegations by the
court's own review of the mandamus record. Id. However, relator also failed to attach a
record of the hearing at which the court issued the order in dispute, so the court had no
competent evidence with which it could evaluate the veracity of relator's allegations. Id. at
385.
78. In re Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 76 S.W.3d 144, 147-48 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2002, orig. proceeding).
79. In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 227 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding)
(relator sought an order compelling the trial court to hold a hearing on relator's Motion for
a Free Copy of the Trial Appellate Record).
80. See Rivercenter Assoc. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (orig.
proceeding).
81. In re East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 72 S.W.3d 445, 448-49 (Tex. App.-Tyler
2002, orig. proceeding).
82. Collins v. Ison-Newsome, 73 S.W.3d 178, 1.80 (Tex. 2001).
83. Id.; TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 22.225(c); 22.001(a)(2) (Vernon 1988 & Supp.
2003).
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tion of law material to a decision of the case."'84 To have conflicts juris-
diction, the rulings in the two cases must be "so far upon the same state
of facts that the decision of one case is necessarily conclusive of the deci-
sion in the other. '85 For jurisdictional purposes, cases conflict only if the
conflict "is upon the very question of law actually decided." Factual iden-
tity between the cases is not required, but cases do not conflict if "a mate-
rial factual difference legitimately distinguishes their holdings."'86
Applying these principles over an interlocutory appeal from a trial
court's denial of the appellants' motion for summary judgment based on
an assertion of immunity, the Texas Supreme Court in Collins concluded
that the standards for a conflict were not met in any of the four cases
cited by appellants. The supreme court rejected the first case on the
ground that it was decided after the court of appeals decided Collins.87
The supreme court pointed out that, under section 22.001(a)(2) of the
Government Code, the court's conflicts jurisdiction is limited to circum-
stances in which "one of the courts of appeals holds differently from a
prior decision of another court of appeals." 88 Since the Enriquez decision
cited by appellants was decided after the court of appeals decided Collins,
it was not a "prior decision" of another court of appeals, under the stat-
ute's plain language. 89
The court rejected the second case cited by appellants, Williams v.
Chatman,90 concluding that the courts of appeals in the two cases (Collins
and Williams) did not announce conflicting rules of law but, instead,
based their holdings specifically on the sufficiency of the summary judg-
ment evidence. In Williams, the Amarillo Court of Appeals concluded
that the defendants' summary judgment evidence established as a matter
of law that they were acting within the scope of their duties when the
incident occurred; whereas, the court of appeals in Collins concluded that
defendants failed to conclusively prove they were acting within the scope
of their duties.91 The supreme court further distinguished the two cases
by noting that Williams involved claims of negligence while the plaintiff
in Collins asserted intentional torts.92 Because the courts of appeals in
each case based their holding specifically on the sufficiency of the sum-
mary judgment evidence, which the supreme court noted was "a highly
fact-specific inquiry driven by the different nature of the claims in each
case," the supreme court could not conclude that the decision in Williams
was "necessarily conclusive" of Collins.93
84. Id.
85. Collins, 73 S.W.3d at 181.
86. Id. (quoting Coastal Corp. v. Garza, 979 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1998)).
87. Id. at 180 (rejecting Enriquez v. Khouri, 13 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000,
no pet.) as creating a basis for conflicts jurisdiction).
88. Id. (quoting TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)(2)) (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Williams v. Chatman, 17 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. denied).
91. Williams, 17 S.W.3d at 699; Collins, 73 S.W.3d at 180.
92. Collins, 73 S.W.3d at 181-82.
93. Id. at 182.
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The supreme court rejected the remaining two decisions cited by the
appellants as conflicting decisions among the courts of appeals, on the
basis that the decisions were not designated for publication and therefore
had no precedential value.94 Having no precedential value, the supreme
court reasoned, the cases could not "operate to overrule" a later case
and, therefore, could not be the basis for conflicts jurisdiction. 95
The dissent in Collins criticized the majority's conclusions on a number
of grounds. First, the dissent argued that a direct conflict existed between
one of the unpublished opinions cited by the appellants and the case
before the court because the court of appeals in each case required differ-
ent levels of proof to establish immunity.96 The dissent also contended
that conflicts jurisdiction is available when the conflict is among different
panels of the same court of appeals (the conflict does not have to be
among two separate courts of appeals) and that the Rules of Appellate
Procedure governing the publication of opinions do not deprive unpub-
lished opinions of significance in determining the supreme court's juris-
diction.97 The dissent harshly concluded that "[clonfusion, and waste,
which 'conflicts jurisdiction' is designed to avoid, are the hallmarks of the
Court's 'conflicts jurisdiction' jurisprudence. 'Conflicts jurisdiction,' in
the Court's hands, is not a functional tool for resolving conflicts in the law
but a contorted choreography for dancing around them." 98
The Texas Supreme Court revisited the issue of conflicts jurisdiction in
Texas Department of Transportation v. Garza, where the jurisdictional
analysis was more straight-forward. 99 Garza involved a personal injury
lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs against the Texas Department of Transporta-
tion for failing to correct "the absence, condition, or malfunction of a
road sign within a reasonable time after notice."' 100 The defendant was
granted summary judgment based on sovereign immunity and the plain-
tiffs filed an interlocutory appeal to the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
(Garza I). The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, hold-
ing that the speed limit sign at issue was a condition that should have
been corrected by the defendant, thereby waiving defendant's immunity
from suit.1°1
94. Id. at 183. See TEX. R. App. P. 47.7. Rule 47 has since been amended to extinguish
the designation of opinions as "unpublished." However, under new Rule 47, while cases
previously not designated for publication may be cited, they still have no precedential
value. TEx. R. App. P. 47.7.
95. Collins, 73 S.W.3d at 183. The court rejected one of the unpublished opinions for
the additional reason that is was not a decision of "another court," as required by Govern-
ment Code § 22.225(c), but was decided by a different panel of the same court as the case
on appeal. Id. at 188 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 188-89 (Hecht, J., dissenting, joined by Owen, J.) (discussing Outman v. Al-
len ISD Bd. of Trs., No. 380-963-95, 1999 WL 817694 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 14,1999, no
pet.) (not designated for publication).
97. Id. at 191-92.
98. Id. at 193.
99. Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Garza, 70 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2002).
100. Id. at 804.
101. Id.
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On remand, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
reasserting its sovereign immunity defense. The trial court denied this
motion, and the defendant filed a second interlocutory appeal to the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals (Garza II). In the second appeal, the
Corpus Christi court expressly adopted the reasoning of the panel in
Garza I, i.e., that the speed limit sign at issue was a condition that should
have been corrected by the defendant and immunity from suit was
waived. 102
On appeal to the supreme court from the second interlocutory appeal,
the defendant argued that conflicts jurisdiction existed because the opin-
ion in Garza II conflicted with the opinion from the Austin Court of Ap-
peals in Bellnoa v. City of Austin.10 3 Although the plaintiff argued that
there was no conflict, the Austin Court of Appeals in Bellnoa expressly
declined to follow the Corpus Christi court's decision in Garza I, which
the Garza II court had adopted. Recognizing conflicts jurisdiction over
the interlocutory appeal, the supreme court concluded that the Garza I
court's holding, which was expressly adopted by the Garza I! court,
"would necessarily operate to overrule the Bellnoa court's decision if
both had been rendered by the same court.' 1 0 4
A few months after Garza, the Texas Supreme Court again found that
it had conflicts jurisdiction in Texas Natural Resource Conservation Com-
mission v. IT-Davy, another case involving the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity.105 The conflict resulted from the Austin Court of Appeals'
holding that the defendant had waived immunity from suit by engaging in
conduct beyond the mere execution of a contract, which was in direct
conflict with the prior rejection by the Amarillo Court of Appeals in Ho
v. University of Texas at Arlington'0 6 of any waiver-by-conduct exception
to sovereign immunity when a private party sues the State. 0 7 Conflicts
jurisdiction existed over the IT-Davy interlocutory appeal, because the
Austin court's decision in IT-Davy "would operate to overrule Ho if the
same court of appeals had rendered the decision. 10 8
Reaffirming that conflicts jurisdiction requires a conflict that is "on the
very question of law actually involved and determined," the Texas Su-
preme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lopez
found no conflicts jurisdiction where the alleged conflict arose from state-
ments by the court of appeals that were dicta.109 In Lopez, an interlocu-
102. Id. at 804-05.
103. Id. at 805 (citing Bellnoa v. City of Austin, 894 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Austin
1995, no writ)).
104. Id. at 805-06.
105. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex.
2002).
106. Ho v. University of Tex. at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998,
pet. denied).
107. Id. at 682-83.
108. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 853.
109. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 129, No. 01-0540, 2002
WL 31426668, at *1 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2002) (per curiam).
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tory appeal from a trial court order certifying a class, the petitioners
argued that the court of appeals' opinion conflicted with the supreme
court's opinion in Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, where the Texas
Supreme Court stated that "[a] trial court's certification order must indi-
cate how the claims will likely be tried so that conformance with Rule 42
may be meaningfully evaluated."' 110 Arguing that a conflict existed, the
petitioners pointed to language in the court of appeals' opinion on re-
hearing in Lopez that "we do not read ... Bernal ... to require a trial
plan in every class certification order."'''1 Rejecting this statement as a
basis for jurisdiction, the supreme court held "[d]icta cannot be the basis
of conflicts jurisdiction."' 12
On the same day it decided Lopez, the Texas Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Schein v. Stromboe, but reached a very different result.' 13
Like Lopez, Schein involved an interlocutory appeal from a court of ap-
peals' affirmation of a trial court's class certification order, and the al-
leged basis for conflicts jurisdiction in the supreme court rested upon a
conflict with Bernal.'1 4 Unlike in Lopez, however, a majority of the su-
preme court in Schein found that the court of appeals' opinion conflicted
with the court's opinion in Bernal.' 15 Perhaps recognizing the inconsis-
tencies between the holdings in Lopez and Schein, the supreme court
granted rehearing in Lopez." 16
In Schein, the majority concluded that Schein and Bernal conflicted in
two respects." 17 First, while giving lip-service to the supreme court's ad-
monitions in Bernal that "a cautious approach to class certification is es-
sential" and that certification is not appropriate "if it is not determinable
from the outset that the individual issues can be considered in a managea-
ble, time-efficient, yet fair manner," the court of appeals failed to indicate
how, or even if, a number of the plaintiffs' claims would be tried." 8
Acknowledging that the court of appeals did not overtly refuse to fol-
low Bernal, the Schein majority nonetheless found that the court of ap-
peals' failure to properly apply Bernal reflected a conflict. In defense of
its position that this situation created a conflict, the court argued that
"outspoken disagreement is not necessary to invoke our conflicts jurisdic-
tion .... What is required for conflict jurisdiction is that the two decisions
cannot stand together."' 19 In other words, a conflict does not disappear
merely because the court of appeals asserts that it is following the proper
standards. The supreme court concluded that it would not be possible,
110. Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000).
11l. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 68 S.W.3d 701, 702 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2001)(op. on reh'g), dism'd per curiam, 2002 WL 31426668 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2002).
112. Lopez, 2002 WL 31426668, at *1.
113. Schein v. Stromboe, No. 00-1162, 2002 WL 31426407 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2002).
114. Id. at *1, *8.
115. Id. at *8-10.
116. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez., 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 129 (May 8, 2003).
117. Id. at *8-11.
118. Id. at *8-9.
119. Id. at *9.
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applying the same standards to both cases, "to reverse the certification
order in Bernal and affirm the order in [Schein].' 120 Accordingly, under
Schein, conflicts jurisdiction may exist where the court of appeals cor-
rectly states the law but misapplies it.121
The supreme court also found that conflicts jurisdiction existed in
Schein because the court of appeals' standard of review, both as stated
and as applied, conflicted with the standard set forth in Bernal.122 Under
Bernal, the trial court and court of appeals must find "actual, not pre-
sumed, conformance with [Tex. R. Civ. P. 42]" when conducting the class
certification analysis. 123 In its opinion in Schein, the court of appeals held
that, in reviewing the class certification order, it would "entertain every
presumption in favor" of the trial court's decision. 124 Noting that, in
Bernal, the supreme court expressly refused to indulge every presump-
tion in favor of the trial court's ruling, the supreme court concluded that
the Schein court of appeals' contrary holding conflicted with Bernal.1 25
Accordingly, under Schein, conflicts jurisdiction may exist where the stan-
dards of review applied in two cases are in conflict.
The dissenting justices argued that the majority's opinion "starkly illus-
trates its desire to expand [the Court's] interlocutory-appeal jurisdiction
beyond the clear parameters the Legislature has imposed."'1 26 Noting
that Bernal involved personal injury claims while Schein did not, the dis-
senting justices pointed to the supreme court's previous holding in Collins
that the differences between personal injury classes and non-personal in-
jury classes "are so significant as to defeat conflicts jurisdiction."' 127 The
dissenters accused the supreme court of ignoring significant factual and
legal differences between the two cases, grounding its conflicts analysis
"on nothing more than disagreement with the court of appeals' result,"
something that "has never been sufficient to invoke our interlocutory-
appeal jurisdiction, until today. '"128
The dissent similarly criticized the majority's finding of conflicts juris-
diction based on the differing standards of review employed by the two
courts of appeals, arguing first that different standards were not used and
second that, even if they were, "we have long recognized that inconsistent
statements are not sufficient for conflicts jurisdiction. 1 129 According to
the dissent, a court of appeals' articulation of the review standard cannot
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *10-11.
123. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435.
124. Schein, 2002 WL 31426407, at *10-11.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *19 (O'Neill, J., dissenting, joined by Enoch, J. and Hankinson, J.). Not
surprisingly, the majority opinion was authored by Justice Hecht, who wrote the dissenting
opinion ten months earlier in Collins v. Ison-Newsome, 73 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2001), arguing
in favor of finding conflicts jurisdiction. Id. at 185 (Hecht, J., dissenting, joined by Owen,
J.).
127. Schein, 2002 WL 31426407, at *20.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *22.
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constitute a conflict "on the very question of law actually involved and
determined" and, thus, "cannot invoke our jurisdiction over this interloc-
utory appeal.' 130
2. Dissent Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
In addition to conflicts jurisdiction as a basis for the supreme court's
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, the supreme court may review
such appeals if the justices of the court of appeals disagree on a question
of law material to the decision (dissent jurisdiction). 31 During the Sur-
vey period, the supreme court exercised this jurisdiction in American
Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, an interlocutory appeal from
the denial of a special appearance. 132 The supreme court held that it had
jurisdiction to review the appeal because one justice of the court of ap-
peals dissented from the denial of the appellant's petition for en banc
rehearing. The supreme court found dissent jurisdiction even though the
dissenting court of appeals' justice did not sit on the original panel decid-
ing the case. 133
3. Interlocutory Appeals in the Courts of Appeals
a. Orders Subject to Interlocutory Appeal
i. Denial of summary judgment based on immunity
Section 51.014(a)(5) of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code provides
for an interlocutory appeal from the denial of "a motion for summary
judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who
is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the
state.' 34 Under this provision, interlocutory review is available to both
the individual and his employer seeking summary judgment based on the
doctrine of official immunity. 35 The employer may take advantage of
section (5) because its claim of sovereign immunity may be based on the
individual's assertion of qualified immunity. 136 Moreover, the employer's
theory of sovereign immunity may be asserted on either the actual or
hypothetical assertion of official or qualified immunity. 137 Under these
circumstances, the employer's denial of summary judgment is within the
130. Id.
131. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
132. American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex.
2002).
133. Id. at 805.
134. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
135. Brazos Transit Dist. v. Lozano, 72 S.W.3d 442, 443 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002,
no pet.) (citing Putthoff v. Ancrum, 934 S.W.2d 164, 166 n.2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996,
writ denied)).
136. Id. at 443-44 (citing City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1993)).
137. Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Tate, 77 S.W.3d 467, 470 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, no pet.). However, the summary judgment motion must be based on the assertion of
official immunity by an individual and liability of the governmental entity premised on
vicarious liability. Id.
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ambit of section (5).138 Section (5), however, does not provide for an
interlocutory appeal where the employer and employee are denied sum-
mary judgment based on assertions of only sovereign immunity and there
is no assertion of qualified immunity on behalf of the employee (actual or
hypothetical). 39
ii. Denial of plea to the jurisdiction by governmental entity
In contrast to subsection (a)(5), section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code permits an interlocutory appeal from the de-
nial of an assertion of sovereign immunity, but only if the procedural ve-
hicle for such assertion is a plea to the jurisdiction. 140 This provision does
not provide for an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for
summary judgment just because it is based on an assertion of sovereign
immunity. In fact, the basis of the plea in section (8) is not limited; the
purpose of section (8) was to add eligible orders to the types of orders
subject to interlocutory appeal, not to provide a basis for interlocutory
appeal from the denial of any motion so long as it is based on sovereign
immunity.141 Rather, the legislature made a plea to the jurisdiction eligi-
ble for interlocutory appeal "regardless of its basis, not because of it.' 1 42
iii. Order appointing receiver
Under section 51.014(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code, a party may appeal an interlocutory order appointing a receiver. 143
An order dissolving a receivership is not appealable, and the disposition
of receivership funds also may not be challenged by interlocutory appeal,
even if such disposition has the effect of creating a de facto
receivership. 144
iv. Orders allowing or denying intervention or joinder
Section 15.003(c) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code pro-
vides a limited right of interlocutory appeal as to joinder and intervention
138. Lozano, 72 S.W.3d at 443-44.
139. Id. at 444; Tate, 77 S.W.3d at 470-71.
140. Lozano, at 444-45. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon
Supp. 2003).
141. Id. at 444 (citing City of Austin v. L.S. Ranch, Ltd., 970 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1998, no pet.)).
142. Id. Notably, however, a motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of
immunity from suit, as opposed to immunity merely from liability, may be properly con-
strued as a plea to the jurisdiction, the denial of which would provide a basis for interlocu-
tory appeal under section (8). See Tate, 77 S.W.3d at 471-73 (concluding that motion for
summary judgment could not be construed as plea to the jurisdiction because it was based
on immunity from liability and not immunity from suit).
143. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
144. Waite v. Waite, 76 S.W.3d 222, 223 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
denied). In Waite, the trial court dissolved the receivership while the receivership order
was pending on interlocutory appeal but the funds under the receiver's control had been
deposited into the registry of the court, creating a de facto receivership. Id.
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decisions of the trial court. 145 This provision may not be used to obtain
interlocutory appellate review of a trial court's venue rulings. 146 The leg-
islature has provided that no interlocutory appeal is available from a trial
court's determination of a venue question.147
Accordingly, when analyzing whether an interlocutory appeal is per-
mitted under section 15.003(c), the court of appeals must accept the trial
court's venue determination with respect to a given plaintiff and, if the
trial court determines that venue is proper under section 15.002, the court
of appeals' inquiry is over. This is so, even if the trial court "errone-
ously[] decides that venue is proper under section 15.002." 148 Section
15.003(c) allows an interlocutory appeal only for one specific purpose: "to
contest the trial court's decision allowing or denying intervention or
joinder." 149
b. Procedure
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) requires a notice of appeal
in an accelerated appeal to be filed within 20 days from the date the order
is signed. °50 Despite the supreme court's direction to the courts of ap-
peals to construe the Rules of Appellate Procedure reasonably so that the
right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely neces-
sary to effect the purposes of a rule, 15t courts of appeals are prohibited
from enlarging the time for perfecting an appeal in a civil case and have
no discretion but to dismiss an appeal for want of jurisdiction when the
notice of appeal is late.152
c. Attorney's Fees
In an appeal brought pursuant to section 51.014(6) of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code, which permits an interlocutory appeal by a
media defendant from the denial of summary judgment, the court of ap-
peals "shall" order the appellant to pay all costs and reasonable attorney
fees of the appeal if the order is affirmed. 153 The court of appeals can
grant such fees on motion filed after the court of appeals' opinion is
issued. 154
145. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c) (Vernon 2002).
146. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Pioneer Elec. (USA) Inc., 68 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
147. Id. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 2002).
148. Pioneer Elec. (USA) Inc., 68 S.W.3d at 258 (citing American Home Prods. Corp. v.
Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex. 2000)).
149. Id. (citing Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 96).
150. TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(b).
151. See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997).
152. In re T.W., 89 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.); TEX. R. APP. P. 2.
153. See New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 91 S.W.3d 844, 864 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002,
pet. filed); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.015 (Vernon 1997).
154. New Times, Inc., 91 S.W.3d at 864.
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d. Stay of Trial Pending Appeal
Under section 51.014(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code,
an interlocutory appeal "shall have the effect of staying the commence-
ment of trial in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal.' 55 The
stay, which requires commencement of trial stayed after an appeal has
been filed, is "mandatory and allows no room for discretion.' 56 Accord-
ingly, a trial court that begins trial after such an appeal is filed commits
error and must begin the trial anew after resolution of the appeal. 157
III. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
There are three basic steps to preserving error. First, state a clear ob-
jection. Second, get a ruling on the objection. Third, make certain that
your objection and ruling are both in the appellate record.' 58 The cases
in this Survey period show that putting these steps into practice can be a
minefield for the unwary practitioner, especially in light of the varying
application of the rules among different appellate courts.
A. MAKING A TIMELY COMPLAINT
1. No Objection Required
Some arguments can be raised for the first time on appeal. For in-
stance, substantive defects in evidence, such as the failure of an expert to
be qualified to testify on a particular subject or the fact that an affidavit is
conclusory, can be pointed out for the first time on appeal. 159 Addition-
ally, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, has held that in a bench trial legal
sufficiency challenges can be raised for the first time on appeal. 160 In
155. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
156. Waite, 76 S.W.3d at 223.
157. Id.
158. Preservation of error is governed by Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which provides:
(a) In General. As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate
review, the record must show that:
(1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objec-
tion, or motion that:
(A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party
sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the
trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were
apparent from the context; and
(B) complied with the requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil or
Criminal Evidence or the Texas Rules of Civil or Appellate Proce-
dure; and
(2) the trial court:
(A) ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or
implicitly; or
(B) refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the
complaining party objected to the refusal.
TEX. R. App. P. 33.1.
159. Trusty v. Strayhorn, 87 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).




reaching this conclusion, the court looked to former Rule 52(d) of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which expressly provided that legal
sufficiency challenges to a non-jury trial need not be preserved in the trial
court. 161 The court then looked to the comment to current Rule 33.1 of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that former Rule
52 was omitted from the new rule as unnecessary because Rule 324 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure addresses what types of challenges must
be preserved in the trial court.162 The court then turned to Rule 324,
which requires a motion for new trial only to preserve factual (not legal)
sufficiency challenges and concluded that, in a bench trial, legal suffi-
ciency challenges can be raised for the first time on appeal.
163
2. Objection Required
In most instances, a proper objection must be raised in the trial court
before error can be assigned on appeal. In cases where a party has failed
to preserve error through a proper objection, that party is often left mak-
ing some very creative arguments on appeal. The arguments in this Sur-
vey period are no exception.
For instance, in Trusty v. Strayhorn,164 the Texarkana Court of Appeals
rejected the defendants' argument that because it was successful on sum-
mary judgment it did not need to object to its opponent's summary judg-
ment evidence.165 Defendants reasoned that Rule 166a(f) 166 requires
only the party seeking to reverse a summary judgment to object to sum-
mary judgment proof.167 Considering the conflicting authorities on the
issue, the court concluded that "the better rule is that a party seeking
affirmance of a summary judgment is required to object to claimed de-
fects in the form of summary judgment affidavits" and obtain a ruling on
such objections. 168 Because defendants failed to obtain a ruling from the
trial court on their objections to the form of the summary judgment affi-
davit, defendants waived any argument that plaintiff's affidavit did not
constitute proper summary judgment evidence. 169
In other cases, appellate courts have found waiver where the objection
raised in the trial court did not match the complaint on appeal. In
O'Kehie v. Harris Leasing Co.,170 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held
that a party who objected to admission of certain exhibits at trial on the
161. Id. at 242.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Trusty, 87 S.W.3d at 756.
165. Id. at 762.
166. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f). Rule 166a(f) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in relevant part: "Defects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be grounds
for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party ......
167. Trusty, 87 S.W.3d at 762.
168. Id. at 763.
169. Id. at 764.
170. O'Kehie v. Harris Leasing Co., 80 S.W.3d 316, 318 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
no pet).
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grounds that the exhibits were not properly sequenced and could not be
reconciled could not complain on appeal that some of the exhibits were
presented to the jury even though they were never introduced. The court
concluded that the time to object to the wrong exhibits going to the jury
would have been in the trial court. 171
Similarly, in Celanese Ltd. v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc.,172 the
Texarkana Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff waived any argu-
ment that the charge did not address its claims of lost profits and lost
value because its only objection to the damage issue at charge conference
was that the question submitted an improper measure of damages.173
The appellate court also found fault with the plaintiff for failing to tender
a proposed instruction requesting the damage elements it complained on
appeal had been absent from the charge. 174
Where a party fails to invoke a procedural right in the trial court, that
party will not be permitted to complain on appeal of the trial court's sua
sponte, yet incorrect, efforts to exercise that right. In Suggs v. Fitch,175
the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a defendant could not com-
plain on appeal about the procedure used by the trial court in its sua
sponte polling of the jury because the defendant never requested the pol-
ling in the first place. 176
3. Steps to a Proper Objection
The Texas Supreme Court provided guidance during this Survey period
as to how to make a proper objection. In Miga v. Jensen,177 the defendant
objected twice during the charge conference that plaintiff's damages were
limited to the value of the stock at the time of breach. On the second
objection the trial court interrupted the defendant saying "you've got
your objection on the record.' 78 The supreme court stated that the "trial
court's subsequent refusal to limit the damages submission as requested
effectively overruled the objection" and concluded that error had been
preserved by a proper timely objection ruled on by the trial court.179
B. GETTING A RULING
How does a court implicitly rule on a parties' objections? This ques-
tion has plagued the courts since Rule 33 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure was amended to permit review where a trial court has ruled on
171. Id.
172. Celanese Ltd. v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., 75 S.W.3d 593, 600-01 (Tex. App.-Tex-
arkana 2002, pet. denied).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Suggs v. Fitch, 64 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
176. Id. at 660.
177. Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. 2002).




a request "either expressly or implicitly."' 80 The outcome has been
something similar to the United States Supreme Court's standard on por-
nography: they know it when they see it.
During the Survey period, the Texarkana Court of Appeals attempted
to reconcile the various authorities interpreting what constitutes an im-
plied ruling on an objection under Rule 33 of the Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure.181 As the Texarkana court noted, several opinions from
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals have found an implied ruling on objec-
tions to summary judgment evidence based on a broad summary judg-
ment order. 182 However, the Texarkana court refused to presume that by
granting summary judgment for a party, the trial court necessarily implic-
itly ruled in that parties' favor on all evidentiary objections. 183 Rather,
the court concluded that a party still has a burden under Rule 33.1 to
obtain a ruling on all objections, but that the burden is satisfied if:
(1) the record affirmatively indicates that the trial court ruled on the
objections to the summary judgment proof in granting summary
judgment or (2) the grounds for summary judgment and the objec-
tions to the summary judgment proof are of such a nature that the
granting of summary judgment necessarily implies a ruling on the
objections. 84
In applying this standard, the court explained that it is not enough to
show that the court considered the objections, but the party must also
show that the court ruled on those objections.' 85 Only where the trial
court could not have granted summary judgment without having ruled on
the objections to the evidence will the court imply a ruling. 186
In a case before the First Court of Appeals, the plaintiff argued on
appeal that by refusing to submit the plaintiffs' requested jury question
on its DTPA claims, the trial court implicitly granted defendants' motion
for directed verdict on those claims.187 In Fletcher v. Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co., the trial court denied defendants' motion for directed
verdict on plaintiffs' DTPA claims. Plaintiffs then submitted their DTPA
claims as part of a mass fourteen-question proposed jury charge, which
was refused by the trial court. 188 On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the
refusal of their charge submission was an implicit directed verdict on
plaintiffs' DTPA claims.' 89 The First Court of Appeals rejected this argu-
ment, holding that the denial of a jury charge submission does not consti-
180. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A).




185. Id. at 761.
186. Id.
187. Fletcher v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 57 S.W.3d 602, 604-05 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
188. Id.
189. It is not clear why plaintiffs did not challenge the trial court's refusal to submit
their DTPA claim to the jury. Id. at 605.
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tute an implied directed verdict on that claim.' 90 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted several factors weighing against plaintiffs' ar-
gument. First, the trial court's ruling on the charge submission was in
response to a mass submission and the ruling was not directed specifically
at the DTPA submission. 191 Second, by including the DTPA claim in the
proposed charge, plaintiffs clearly believed that the claim remained via-
ble after the trial court's denial of defendants' directed verdict. 192 Third,
the trial court expressly ruled on plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict
and denied it.193
While many courts are grappling with implicit rulings, some courts are
still being asked to consider what constitutes an explicit "signed" order
for purposes of Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. In
Cummings v. Cire,194 the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a docket
entry notation indicating denial of summary judgment "does not consti-
tute a signed order for purposes of appeal." 195 There was no discussion in
the opinion of whether Rule 33.1 required such a "signed" order to pre-
serve error or whether the docket entry could ever constitute an implicit
ruling.
C. OFFERS OF PROOF AND BILLS OF EXCEPTION
Making a record for the appellate court can be wrought with traps for
the unwary. Rule 33.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure pro-
vides a process for submitting a formal bill of exception for evidence that
would not otherwise appear in the record.1 96 Rule 33.2 permits a party to
file such a bill "no later than 30 days after the filing party's notice of
appeal is filed."'197 In contrast, Rule 103 of the Texas Rules of Evidence
requires a party to present any excluded evidence to the trial court by
offer of proof before the charge is read to the jury.' 98 At least some
courts have held that failure to strictly comply with the procedures for
making an offer of proof under Rule 103 waives review of excluded evi-
dence in the court of appeals, even when such evidence is otherwise in
the appellate record.
In Fletcher v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. ,199 the trial court
excluded testimony from one of the plaintiffs' experts at trial. Plaintiffs
asked the court to allow them to make an offer of proof, but plaintiffs
failed to do so before the charge was submitted to the jury.200 In fact,
even after the jury returned a no-liability verdict in favor of the defend-
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Fletcher, 57 S.W.3d at 605.
193. Id.
194. Cummings v. Cire, 74 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. granted).
195. Id. at 923.
196. TEX. R. App. P. 33.2.
197. TEX. R. App. P. 33.2(e)(1).
198. TEX. R. EVID. 103(a), (b).
199. Fletcher, 57 S.W.3d at 602.
200. Id. at 605.
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ants and the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against plaintiffs,
plaintiffs still failed to make an offer of proof.20 1 Plaintiffs' first effort to
place the missing evidence regarding their expert witness into the record
came 30 days after they perfected appeal.2 02 However, even this submis-
sion was incorrect in that it failed to attach the evidence included in the
offer of proof.2 0 3 Plaintiffs finally submitted the proper evidence in an
amended bill of exceptions more than three months after the trial court's
plenary power had expired.204
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals found that plaintiffs waived any er-
ror in excluding their expert because they failed to make a proper offer of
proof by not submitting the relevant evidence to the trial court before the
charge was read to the jury.205 The court reasoned that the "offer of
proof serves primarily to enable the reviewing court to assess whether
excluding the evidence was erroneous and, if so, whether the error was
harmful. 120 6 Because the purpose of the offer of proof is to give the
court a chance to correct error before the case goes to the jury, a party
cannot rely on the bill of exceptions provision under Rule 33.2 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to obviate a party's duty to make an
offer of proof.20 7
Perhaps the most significant lesson from the court's ruling in Fletcher is
highlighted by the dissenting opinion. In her dissent, Judge Margaret
Mirabal notes that even though the plaintiffs did not satisfy the offer of
proof or formal bill of exceptions requirements, there was nonetheless
significant evidence in the record of the subject matter of the excluded
expert's testimony.208 In defendants' pretrial motion to exclude the ex-
pert's testimony, defendants attached "34 exhibits primarily consisting of
[the expert's] testimony in previous breast implant cases." °209 These ex-
hibits further provided details of the expert's background, education and
experience. 210 Additionally, at the pretrial hearing on defendant's mo-
tion to exclude the expert, plaintiffs' counsel summarized the expert's tes-
timony. Yet, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals still found waiver.211
IV. JUDGMENTS
A. FINALITY IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONTEXT
Following its 2001 decision in Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.,212 the su-
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 606.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 608.
207. Id. at 608-09.




212. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001).
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preme court continued during the Survey period to monitor the court of
appeals' decisions regarding finality, admonishing that the inclusion of
"Mother Hubbard" language in an order issued without a full trial cannot
be taken as an indication of finality.213 For example, in Nash, a suit filed
against both individual and institutional defendants, the Texas Supreme
Court looked to the pleadings filed by the plaintiff to determine the num-
ber of parties in the lawsuit and to the order granting summary judgment
to determine the trial court's disposition of those parties. Noting that the
order referred only to the motion for summary judgment of the individual
defendants, and did not mention the institutional defendants, the su-
preme court reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that the Mother
Hubbard clause made the order final.2 14
The supreme court, however, verified during the Survey period that
even if the record fails to show an adequate motion or other legal basis
for the trial court's disposition, if the language of the summary judgment
order shows finality, the judgment is final, regardless of the correctness of
the trial court's adjudication of all parties and issues.2 15 Thus, the trial
court's express language in Ritzell that "Plaintiff ... Individually and as
Next Friend of [her son], . . . take nothing" was "unequivocally clear" in
adjudicating all claims and parties in the case, rendering the judgment
final, despite the defendant's failure to move for summary judgment on
the son's claims.2 16
B. FINALITY AFTER A CONVENTIONAL TRIAL ON THE MERITS
Unlike in the summary judgment context, the rule of North East Inde-
pendent School District v. Aldridge21 7 still stands that a judgment contain-
ing a "Mother Hubbard" clause entered after a conventional trial on the
merits is presumed final (the so-called "Aldridge presumption").21 8
Under the Texas Supreme Court's 1966 holding in Aldridge,
213. Nash v. Harris County, 63 S.W.3d 415, 416 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). A Mother
Hubbard clause states, in effect, that "all relief not granted herein is hereby denied." Id.
214. Id. at 415-16. Similarly, in Parking Co. of Am. v. Wilson, 58 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2001)
(per curiam), the supreme court reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that a summary
judgment order was final because it included a Mother Hubbard clause where the order
was entitled "Partial Summary Judgment," expressly "granted in part and denied in part"
the motion for summary judgment, and the record reflected that the plaintiff's claim for
attorney's fees was not disposed of by the order but subsequently tried to the bench. Id. at
742.
Post-Lehmann, the courts of appeals are following the principles laid down by the su-
preme court in Lehmann, determining finality in the summary judgment context based not
on the presence or absence of Mother Hubbard language but on an independent examina-
tion of the trial court record to determine whether the order disposes of all claims and
parties. See, e.g., Braeswood Harbor Partners v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 69 S.W.3d
251, 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). The court of appeals in Braes-
wood further held that the trial court's failure to dispose of all parties in the summary
judgment order could not be corrected by a nunc pro tunc summary judgment properly
disposing of all parties. Id.
215. Ritzell v. Espeche, 87 S.W.3d 536, 537 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
216. Id.
217. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
218. Id. at 897-98.
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When a judgment, not intrinsically interlocutory in character, is ren-
dered and entered in a case regularly set for a conventional trial on
the merits, no order for a separate trial having been entered pursu-
ant to Rule 174, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, it will be presumed
for appeal purposes that the Court intended to, and did, dispose of
all parties legally before it and of all issues made by the pleadings
between such parties.2 19
During the Survey period, the supreme court examined the applicabil-
ity of the Aldridge presumption in a situation where the plaintiff pro-
ceeded to trial on the merits against some, but not all, of the defendants,
while pursuing settlement with the remaining defendants.220 The su-
preme court concluded that the judgment entered following the trial was
presumed final where "Mother Hubbard" language was present, even
where the trial court and all parties were aware of the pending, unfinal-
ized, settlement. The supreme court held: "Whether the judgment was
final should not depend on one party's testimony that he did or did not
finalize a settlement with parties from whom he sought no relief at
trial.1221 While not disagreeing with the plaintiff's argument that the Al-
dridge presumption "should not be rigidly applied to make judgments fi-
nal contrary to litigants' reasonable expectations," the supreme court
concluded that the presumption was "entirely appropriate" where there
was nothing to indicate that the trial court did not intend the judgment to
finally dispose of the entire case.222
As noted above, the supreme court held in Aldridge that the presump-
tion does not apply when the judgment is "not intrinsically interlocutory
in character. ' '223 In a case of first impression, the San Antonio Court of
Appeals in Infonova Solutions, Inc. v. Griggs explored the meaning of
this phrase.224 In Infonova, the plaintiff sued on a sworn account seeking
the unpaid balance on the account plus attorney's fees. Prior to trial, the
defendant paid the unpaid balance and the case went to a bench trial on
attorneys' fees. Thereafter, the trial court signed an order denying the
plaintiff's claim for fees. The order did not contain a "Mother Hubbard"
clause.22 5 The trial court later signed a judgment which included "Mother
Hubbard" language and incorporated the court's previous ruling on the
request for attorney's fees.22 6
On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court's initial order de-
nying attorney's fees was a final order from which the plaintiff's deadline
ran for its notice of appeal. Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals
219. Id.
220. John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc., 58 S.W.3d 738, 739-40 (Tex. 2001) (per
curiam).
221. Id. at 740.
222. Id.
223. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 897-98.
224. Infonova Solutions, Inc. v. Griggs, 82 S.W.3d 613, 615-16 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, no pet.).
225. Id. at 615.
226. Id.
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defined an "intrinsically interlocutory" order as "one that does not inher-
ently resolve the merits of a case."' 227 Because, under this definition, an
order denying a request for attorney's fees "does not inherently resolve
the merits of the claim upon which [the] award .. depends," the court
concluded that such an order, standing alone, is "intrinsically
interlocutory." 22
8
C. FINALITY IN THE SEVERANCE CONTEXT
As a general rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a
separate cause makes the severed judgment final. As explained by the
Texas Supreme Court in Harris County Flood Control District v.
Adam, 229 the severed judgment is final not because it contains "Mother
Hubbard" language but because it disposes of all parties and issues in the
new cause. 230 Moreover, presence of such language in the severed judg-
ment does not constitute a final judgment in the original cause-the pur-
pose of the severed order is to sever claims that have been adjudicated
into a separate cause, not to adjudicate claims remaining In the original
cause.
231
However, in keeping with its current trend of focusing on the sub-
stance, rather than mere form, of events at the trial court level in deter-
mining finality, the Texas Supreme Court in Diversified Financial
Systems, Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C.2 32 concluded
that a severance order expressly contemplating that the severed claims
would "proceed as such to final judgment or other disposition in [the trial
court]," precludes a final judgment in the severed action until the later
judgment is signed.2 33
Following the trend set by the supreme court, the Texarkana Court of
Appeals looked beyond the form of the judgment in Cudd Pressure Con-
trol, Inc. v. Sonat Exploration Co. to hold that the trial court's judgment,
"although having the appearance of a final judgment," was not final.23 4
In that multiple-party case, the trial court ordered separate trials for a
227. Id.
228. Id. at 616. The San Antonio Court of Appeals subsequently applied this definition
of "intrinsically interlocutory" in Williams v. Medrano, No. 04-02-00508-CV, 2002 WL
31253966 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 9, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication),
where, seeking to recover attorneys' fees from their former clients, appellants intervened
in a personal injury action in which their former clients were among the plaintiffs. Id. at
*1. The attorney's fees claim was tried to the court and the court signed a judgment dispos-
ing of the claim. On appeal from that judgment, the San Antonio court determined that
the judgment was inherently interlocutory because it did not inherently resolve the plain-
tiffs' personal injury claims. Id.
229. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Adams, 66 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
230. Id. at 266.
231. Id.
232. Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d
794 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
233. Id. at 795.
234. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Sonat Exploration Co., 74 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
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defendant's cross-claims against a co-defendant and its third-party claims
against a third-party defendant.235 Prior to its cross-claims going to trial,
the defendant amended its claims against its co-defendant. In the amend-
ment, the defendant eliminated any reference to the third-party
defendant.
Examining the finality of the judgment rendered after trial on the
cross-claims, the court of appeals noted the general rule that the omission
of a defendant from a plaintiff's amended petition has the effect of dis-
missing that defendant from the lawsuit.236 The court affirmed the appli-
cability of this rule in the situation where there has been no order for
separate trials and all the parties remain set for a single trial together.
The court rejected the rule, however, in cases, like Cudd, involving multi-
ple parties where the trial court has ordered separate trials (as opposed to
a severance) for some of those parties. Under these circumstances, a
plaintiff (or third-party plaintiff) "does not automatically dismiss a previ-
ously named party (co-plaintiff or defendant) by filing pleadings pertain-
ing to one separate trial that omit that party whose rights or liabilities are
the subject of another separate trial in the same case. '237 Noting that
such practice should be avoided because of the confusion it causes in de-
termining the finality of judgments, the court of appeals nonetheless con-
cluded that the judgment in Cudd was not final because a portion of the
same case remained live in the trial court.238
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S PLENARY POWER
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b provides that the trial court will
maintain plenary jurisdiction for 30 days after a motion for new trial is
denied by the trial court in writing or by operation of law.239
In Health Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Nolen,240 the trial court, follow-
ing a trial in which the jury found the defendant negligent and grossly
negligent and awarded the plaintiff actual damages and exemplary dam-
ages, granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the issues of gross negligence and exemplary damages and
signed a judgment on April 27, 1999, awarding plaintiff only her actual
damages. 241 After the plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, the trial court
signed an order on June 29, 1999, granting plaintiff a new trial on the
gross negligence claim and severing that claim from plaintiff's remaining
claims.2 42 On August 10, 2000, the trial court signed an order granting
235. The trial court had previously severed into a separate cause the cross-claims and
third-party claims among the defendants and third-party defendant. Id. at 186.
236. Id. at 188 (citing Crofts v. Court of Civil Appeals, 362 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex.
1962)).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 188-89.
239. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
240. Health Care Ctr. of Tex., Inc. v. Nolen, 62 S.W.3d 813 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no
pet.).
241. Id. at 814.
242. Id.
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plaintiff's motion to reinstate the jury's verdict, and on November 13,
2000, the court signed a final judgment in the severed action recognizing
the jury's previously disregarded verdict on gross negligence and punitive
damages.243
The defendant complained on appeal that the trial court erred when it
reinstated the exemplary damages verdict and entered judgment thereon
because its plenary power had expired before November 13, 2000.244 The
Waco Court of Appeals reversed and rendered, holding that "[a]ccording
to settled case law, a trial court's authority to set aside an order granting a
new trial expires when its plenary power over the original judgment ex-
pires. '245 According to the court of appeals, the trial court's authority to
set aside its June 29, 1999, order granting plaintiff a new trial on her gross
negligence claim expired on Monday, July 12, 1999, 76 days246 after the
original judgment was signed on April 27, 1999.247 As a result, the trial
court lacked authority to enter either the August 10, 2000, order reinstat-
ing the jury's verdict or the November 13, 2000, final judgment.248
In Sadeghian v. Shaw, 249 the plaintiff filed his original petition in small
claims court in Denton County, and the case was transferred on defend-
ants' motion to a justice court in Fannin County.250 The defendant filed a
counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees, obtaining a default judg-
ment on May 30, 2000, when the plaintiff failed to appear at the sched-
uled trial.251 Following the resolution of disputes in justice court and
county court regarding the plaintiff's appeal bond,252 the county court of
Fannin County dismissed the case on March 1, 2001, ordering that all par-
ties take nothing, only to reinstate the same case on its docket one day
later, finding that it had been dismissed by accident. 253
243. Id.
244. Id. at 816.
245. Nolen, 62 S.W.3d at 816 (citing Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789, 789-90 (Tex. 1994)
(orig. proceeding); Fulton v. Finch, 346 S.W.2d 823, 826-27 (Tex. 1961) (orig. proceeding);
Ferguson v. Globe-Texas Co., 35 S.W.3d 688, 690-92 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. de-
nied); Garza v. Gonzalez, 737 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, orig. proceed-
ing)). See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c), which provides: "In the event an original or
amended motion for new trial or a motion to modify, correct or reform a judgment is not
determined by written order signed within seventy-five days after the judgment was signed,
it shall be considered overruled by operation of law on expiration of that period."
246. The court of appeals noted that, although the trial court's plenary power extends
for seventy-five days after the date of the original judgment under TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c),
when the 75th day falls on a Sunday, TEX. R. Civ. P. 4 extends the period to the end of the
following Monday (unless it is a legal holiday). See TEX. R. Civ. P. 4 ("The last day of the
period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in
which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday
or legal holiday.").
247. Nolen, 62 S.W.3d at 816.
248. Id.
249. Sadeghian v. Shaw, 76 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).






In May 2001, the defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion
to transfer to the district court of Fannin County, arguing that the district
court had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter.254 The county court
granted defendant's motion to transfer on June 6, 2001.25-5 On September
7, 2001, the same county court filed an order that (i) affirmed its October
20, 2000 order dismissing the plaintiff's appeal and its March 1, 2001 or-
der dismissing the case with all parties taking nothing; (ii) vacated its
March 1, 2001 order which reinstated the case; (iii) vacated its June 6,
2001 order which transferred the case to the district court; and (iv) "in
summation," dismissed the plaintiff's appeal with prejudice.2 56
The Texarkana Court of Appeals, observing that "[i]t appears that at
this point, the county court's intention was for all parties to take noth-
ing, '257 held that the trial court's September 7, 2001 order "was voidable
and constituted an abuse of discretion" because the county court had only
thirty days after it signed the transfer order on June 6, 2001, to vacate or
modify the order, and did not set the order aside until approximately
three months later, well after its plenary power had expired.258
In In re Luster,2 59 the Fourteenth Court of Appeals followed the rule in
Porter v. Vick 260 and Fulton v. Finch261 that the trial court may only va-
cate or "ungrant" an order granting a new trial during its plenary power
period.262 The original judgment in favor of the defendant was signed
January 26, 2001, and the trial court granted the plaintiff's timely filed
motion for new trial by order signed on April 11, 2001.263 The trial court
then entered an order on November 5, 2001, vacating its April 11, 2001,
order and reinstating the judgment in favor of the defendant.2 64 Because
the trial court's plenary power expired on April 11, 2001, 75 days after its
original judgment was signed on January 26, 2001, the trial court's No-
vember 5, 2001 order and amended final judgment were void. 265
In In re T.G.,266 the First Court of Appeals addressed the relationship
between the trial court's plenary power and its power to sanction.267 Fol-
lowing the rule in Lane Bank Equipment Co. v. Smith Southern Equip.,
Inc.,268 the court of appeals held that the October 27, 2000 filing by appel-
lants of a motion for new trial and an amended motion for sanctions ex-




258. Id. at 231 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d), (e), (g)).
259. In re Luster, 77 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, orig.
proceeding).
260. Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1994).
261. Fulton v. Finch, 346 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. 1961).
262. Luster, 77 S.W.3d at 334.
263. Id. at 335.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. In re T.G., 68 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
267. Id. at 175-77.
268. Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2000).
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tended the trial court's plenary power over its September 28, 2000
judgment of dismissal until January 11, 2001, thereby extending the trial
court's power to sanction for the same time period.2 69 Appellants' mo-
tion for new trial and amended motion for sanctions were not disposed of
by written order, and were accordingly overruled by operation of law on
December 12, 2000.270 The trial court retained plenary jurisdiction and
the power to sanction for an additional 30 days after that.271 The court of
appeals held that, because the trial court signed no additional orders in
the 30 days after December 12, 2000, it lost plenary power over its judg-
ment of dismissal on the 105th day after the judgment was signed,272 and
any orders signed by the trial court after January 11, 2001 were void.273
VI. PERFECTION OF APPEAL
A. RULE 306A
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(1), the periods for filing
post-judgment motions and for calculating the trial court's plenary power
runs from the date the judgment is signed.274 Clerks are to notify parties
immediately when a judgment is signed.2 75 Rule 306a(4) provides that if,
within twenty days after judgment is signed, a party neither receives the
clerk's notice or acquires actual notice of the judgment, then the relevant
time periods shall begin on the date the party received notice of the judg-
ment (not to exceed ninety days). 276 In order to trigger the Rule 306a(4)
extension, Rule 306a(5) provides that a party must file a sworn motion
the date the party first received notice of the judgment.277 However, the
rule does not set a deadline for filing a Rule 306a(5) motion.
In John v. Marshall Health Services, Inc. ,278 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed that issue. Before John, a conflict existed among the courts of
appeals regarding whether a motion to extend post-judgment deadlines
under Rule 306a(5) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure must be filed
within thirty days of the date the movant learned that the judgment had
been signed. Four courts of appeals had held that such a motion must be
269. T.G., 68 S.W.3d at 176-77.
270. Id. at 177 (citing Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1991)); TEX. R. Civ. P.
329b(c) ("In the event an original or amended motion for new trial or a motion to modify,
correct or reform a judgment is not determined by written order signed within seventy-five
days after the judgment was signed, it shall be considered overruled by operation of law on
expiration of that period.").
271. T.G., 68 S.W.3d at 177 (citing Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex.
1995)); Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. 1985).
272. T.G., 68 S.W.3d at 177 (citing Philbrook, 683 S.W.2d at 379); TEX. R. Civ. P.
329b(e), 329b(g).
273. TG., 68 S.W.3d at 178.
274. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(1).
275. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(3).
276. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
277. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(5).
278. John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc., 58 S.W.3d 738, 741 (Tex. 2001).
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filed within thirty days of the date the movant received notice,2 79 while
two had held that a Rule 306a(5) motion could be filed at any time within
the trial court's plenary jurisdiction, measured from the date determined
under Rule 306a(4).280
The supreme court agreed with the latter and disapproved of all cases
reaching a contrary result.281 The court reasoned that Rule 306a "simply
imposes no deadline, and none can be added by decision, other than the
deadline of the expiration of the trial court's jurisdiction. 282
B. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
A party can extend the appellate timetables and the trial court's ple-
nary power over its judgment by filing, within thirty days of the trial
court's judgment, a Rule 329b motion for new trial or to modify, correct,
or reform the judgment, or by requesting findings of fact and conclusions
of law, if such findings could properly be considered by the appellate
court. 283 Amending a Rule 329b motion, however, does not extend the
appellate timetable or the trial court's plenary power.284 Nor does a re-
quest for findings of fact and conclusions of law when the judgment ap-
pealed from was rendered as a matter of law without an evidentiary
hearing.2 85
Moreover, any change in the trial court's judgment while it retains pie-
279. See Health Servs., Inc. v. John, 12 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000),
rev'd, 58 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. 2001); Thompson v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 607, 618
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied); Gonzalez v. Sanchez, 927 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1996, no writ); Montalvo v. Rio Nat'l Bank, 885 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); Womack-Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso,
886 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
280. See Green v. Guidry, 34 S.W.3d 669, 670 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.);
Grondona v. Sutton, 991 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied); Vineyard
Bay Dev. Co. v. Vineyard on Lake Travis, 864 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993,
writ denied).
281. See John, 58 S.W.3d at 741.
282. Id.
283. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 26.1; Williams v. Flores, 88 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Tex. 2002). How-
ever, under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329, a defendant who was served by publication
and who has not previously appeared can file a motion for new trial within two years after
judgment. Thus, in S.P. Dorman Exploration Co. v. Mitchell Energy Co., L.P., 71 S.W.3d
469, 470 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.), the court held that the appellate timetable ran
from the date of the filing of the motion for new trial.
284. See T.G., 68 S.W.3d at 176 (citing In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 n.4 (Tex.
1998)).
285. See Ford v. City of Lubbock, 76 S.W.3d 795,797-98 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no
pet.) (although it is sometimes proper for courts to hold evidentiary hearings on pleas to
the jurisdiction, findings of fact were not required and request for such findings did not
extend appellate timetable where no evidence was received at trial court's hearing on ap-
pellant's plea to jurisdiction); Foster v. Williams, 74 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2002, pet. denied) (request for findings and conclusions will not extend the period for
filing a notice of appeal from a judgment dismissing an action to quiet title based on limita-
tions where the trial court heard no evidence); Ross v. Guerra, 83 S.W.3d 899, 900 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (request for findings and conclusions will not extend the
period for filing a notice of appeal from a summary judgment).
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nary power will restart the appellate timetable. 28 6 When a trial court
amends a judgment, an issue arises regarding whether the appellant has
only thirty days in which to file a notice of appeal, or whether an earlier-
filed motion for new trial has the effect of extending the appellate dead-
line from the amended judgment.287 A number of courts have held that,
in instances in which a Rule 329b motion is filed before the judgment is
amended, it is sufficient to extend the time for filing the notice of appeal
for ninety days after the amended judgment is signed, so long as the sub-
stance of the motion could properly be raised with respect to the
amended judgment.288 Some courts reason that this is so because the mo-
tion is treated as a premature motion.289
In Gunnels v. City of Brownfield, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held
that a motion for new trial was sufficient to extend the time for filing a
notice of appeal to 90 days from the date of the signing of the amended
judgment because the motion assailed the sufficiency of the evidence to
support summary judgment. 290
But what about a motion for new trial that has been expressly over-
ruled or overruled by operation of law before the trial court amends its
judgment? Can such a "dead" motion be considered effective to extend
the time for filing a notice of appeal from an amended judgment? As the
Amarillo Court of Appeals in Gunnels acknowledged, there is no clear
answer in Texas. The Dallas Court of Appeals has held that a motion for
new trial that was overruled by operation of law prior to the entry of the
amended judgment would not extend the appellate timetable because it
can no longer be said to "assail" the subsequent amended judgment.291
But the Amarillo Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that there is no
requirement that a prematurely-filed motion for new trial be a "live
pleading" to extend the appellate timetable from an amended
judgment.292
C. EXTENSIONS OF TIME TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 provides that a party may ex-
tend the deadline for filing a notice of appeal by filing a motion to extend
time within fifteen days after the deadline has expired, reasonably ex-
286. T.G., 68 S.W.3d at 176; Gunnels v. City of Brownfield, No. 07-02-0121-CV, 2002
WL 825567 (Tex. App.-Amarillo May 1, 2002, no pet.) (both citing Lane Bank Equip. Co.
v. Smith S. Equip. Co., 10 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2000)).
287. See Gunnels, 2002 WL 825567, at *2.
288. Id. (citing Maddox v. Cosper, 25 S.W.3d 767, 770 n.3 (Tex. App.-Waco, no pet.)
and Clark v. McFerrin, 760 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ
denied)).
289. See, e.g., Gunnels, 2002 WL 825567, at *3 (citing Dunn v. City of Tyler, 848 S.W.2d
305, 306 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, no writ).
290. Id.
291. Id. (citing A.G. Solar & Co., Inc. v. Nordyke, 744 S.W.2d 646, 647-48 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1988, no writ)).
292. Gunnels, 2002 WL 825567, at *3 (citing Harris Co. Hosp. Dist. v. Estrada, 831
S.W.2d 876, 879-80 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
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plaining the need for an extension.293 In Williams v. Flores, the Texas
Supreme Court held that a party who filed his notice of appeal twelve
days after it was due triggered the application of Rule 26.3 by mailing his
motion for extension of time on the fifteenth day after the deadline for
filing the notice of appeal had expired.2 94
Moreover, under the authority of the supreme court's decision in
Verburgt v. Dorner, a motion for extension will be implied if the appellant
filed a notice of appeal within the fifteen-day period and can present a
reasonable explanation for the late filing.2 95
In the case of In re B.G., the Waco Court of Appeals held that coun-
sel's unawareness of a change in the law constituted a "reasonable expla-
nation" which would support an implied extension under Verburgt. The
B.G. appeal was governed by a recent amendment to the Family Code
requiring that appeals from orders terminating parent-child relationships
follow the rules for accelerated appeals. 2 96 Under the amendments, such
appeals must be filed within 20 days after the order is signed, and post-
trial motions will not extend the timetable for filing the notice of
appeal.297
In B.G., the appellant filed her notice of appeal seven days late under
the changed law.2 98 After the court notified appellant that her notice of
appeal could be considered timely if she offered a reasonable explanation
for the delay, her counsel responded that "he did not realize that the
Legislature had amended the pertinent statutes to make his appeal accel-
erated" and that he "mistakenly believed that the motion for new trial
extended the time for the filing of the notice of appeal (which it would
have done under prior law)."'299 The Waco court concluded that this was
a reasonable explanation for the late filing of the notice of appeal and
allowed the appeal. 300
However, when faced with a similar appeal from a termination order,
the Amarillo Court of Appeals distinguished B.G. and refused to imply
an extension because the appellant waited approximately three months
after the termination order was signed before filing her notice of
293. See TEX. R. Api,. P. 26.3.
294. Williams v. Flores, 88 S.W.3d at 632 (citing TEX. R. Ai'r. P. 9.2(b), regarding the
filing of documents by U.S. mail). The court did not, however, consider whether appellant
gave a reasonable explanation for the extension, and remanded the case to the court of
appeals for further proceedings. Id.
295. See In re B.G., No. 10-02-019-CV, 2002 WL 1339502, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco June
19, 2002, no pet.); Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997).
296. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 109.002(a), 263.405(a) (Vernon 1998).
297. Id. § 263.405(c); TEX. R. Api,. P. 26.1(b).
298. See B.G., 2002 WL 1339502, at *1.
299. Id.
300. Id. at *1-2; see also In re M.A.H., No. 10-02-234-CV, 2002 WL 31319959, at *1-2
(Tex. App.-Waco Oct. 16, 2002, no pet.) (holding that the court would review the appeal
as timely perfected if appellant provided a reasonable explanation for failing to appeal
termination order within time periods established for accelerated appeals).
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appeal. 30
D. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
1. Bona Fide Attempt
Should the Rules of Appellate Procedure be interpreted so liberally
that they allow the filing of a docketing statement to serve as a notice of
appeal sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court? Decid-
ing the issue as one of "first impression," the Texarkana Court of Appeals
surprisingly answered that question, "yes."
In Foster v. Williams,30 2 the appellants failed to properly perfect appeal
because they filed a docketing statement in the court of appeals rather
than filing a notice of appeal in the trial court. Appellants argued that
the docketing statement should serve as a notice of appeal because it con-
tained the essential information required by Texas Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 25.1(d). 30 3 The court of appeals noted that the two documents are
totally different:
A notice of appeal is filed with the trial court clerk and should iden-
tify the court and style of the case, state the date of judgment, state
that the party wishes to appeal, state the court to which an appeal is
taken, and state the names of parties. A copy is to be filed with the
appellate court.
The docketing statement is filed with the appellate court, and it is
required to contain more detailed information than a notice of ap-
peal. A docketing statement does not contain language stating that
the party wishes to appeal. Rather, it assumes that the party wishes
to appeal, and it presupposes that a valid notice of appeal has been
filed. Its purpose is purely administrative, to provide the informa-
tion that allows the appellate court to both properly docket the ap-
peal and efficiently move it forward through the appellate system.304
Despite the differences in the purpose and function of the two docu-
ments, the court cited supreme court authority stating that the appellate
rules should be interpreted liberally and that appellate courts have juris-
diction over any appeal in which the party files an instrument in a bona
fide attempt to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction. 30 5 Based on that
authority, the court of appeals overlooked the appellants' failure to file a
notice of appeal and construed their docketing statement as a bona fide
attempt to perfect an appeal. 30 6
301. See In re T.W., 89 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (op. on
reh'g); see also Ross, 83 S.W.3d at 901 (refusing to imply a request for an extension where
notice of appeal was filed over two months after it was due).
302. Foster v. Williams, 74 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
303. Id. at 201.
304. Id. at 202.
305. Id. at 203 (citing Jones v. Stayman, 747 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. 1987) and Linwood v.
NCNB of Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994)).
306. Id.; see also In re M.A.H., No. 10-02-234-CV, 2002 WL 31319959, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Waco Oct. 16, 2002, no pet.) (citing Foster and construing a motion for new trial and
an affidavit of indigence as a "bona fide attempt" to invoke the court's jurisdiction); B.G.,
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Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1(c)(1) provides that an indigent
must file an affidavit of indigence "with or before the notice of ap-
peal. '307 However, the tender of an affidavit of indigence or an appropri-
ate filing fee is not a prerequisite to perfection. 30 8 Thus, in Wells v.
Breton Mill Apartments, 309 the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the
deadlines for tendering an affidavit of indigence or a filing fee could be
extended under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2310 and accepted ap-
pellant's late-filed affidavit of indigence.
2. Who Must File a Notice of Appeal
Another issue relating to the notice of appeal is whether an appellee
must file a notice of appeal. In Lubbock County v. Trammel's Lubbock
Bail Bonds,311 the Texas Supreme Court refused to grant the relief the
county sought in its Petition for Review because the county, appellee in
the court of appeals, had failed to file a notice of appeal. In Lubbock
County, both the county and the bail-bond companies moved for sum-
mary judgment, and the trial court granted partial relief for both par-
ties.312 Only the bail-bond companies filed notices of appeal in the court
of appeals.313 The court of appeals reversed, and the county sought relief
in the Texas Supreme Court.314 The supreme court concluded that a fact
question existed on the county's summary judgment motion, but refused
to grant relief because the county waived that argument by failing to file a
notice of appeal from the trial court's judgment. 315
3. Must a Notice of Appeal be Filed to Appeal a Particular Order?
This Survey period saw the development of a conflict among courts of
appeals regarding whether an appellant must file a separate notice of ap-
peal from an order denying indigency status or whether a notice of appeal
from the ultimate judgment is sufficient. The Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals, following earlier decisions from the Waco court, concluded that
"the simplest way to deal with this type of situation is to require a party
who wishes to appeal from the order on indigency [to] file a separate
2002 WL 1339502, at *2 (holding that a defective notice of appeal that failed to state that
the appeal was accelerated was a "bona fide attempt" to invoke the court's jurisdiction).
307. TEX. R. ApP. P. 20.1(c)(1).
308. See In re Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex. 1998).
309. Wells v. Brenton Mill Apartments, 85 S.W.3d 823,824 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001,
no pet.) (op. on reh'g), dism'd for want of prosecution, No. 07-01-0320-CV, 2002 WL
1801753 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Aug. 6, 2002, no pet.).
310. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 provides that an appellate court may, "to
-expedite a decision or for other good cause," suspend a rule's operation and order a differ-
ent procedure. TEX. R. AiP. P. 2.
311. Lubbock Cty. v. Trammel's Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Tex. 2002).
312. Id. at 582.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 583.
315. Id. at 584 (citing TEx. R. App. P. 25.1, which provides that a "party who seeks to
alter the trial court's judgment ... must file a notice of appeal.").
1096 [Vol. 56
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
notice of appeal from its appeal of a judgment. 316
The Amarillo Court of Appeals disagreed.317 It reasoned that allowing
the appellant to challenge the order sustaining the contest to appellant's
affidavit of indigency as part of her existing appeal "eliminate[d] a source
of possible confusion about the number of records required to be filed,
docketing of and filings in more than one appeal from a single substantive
trial court case, considerations of whether severance or consolidation of
appeals should occur, and similar practical issues."'318 The court therefore
concluded that a separate notice of appeal appealing the denial of indi-
gency status was not required.319
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(d)(2) provides that an appel-
lant's notice of appeal must include the date of the judgment or order
appealed from.320 However, this rule does not require parties to recite
the date each adverse order was signed, so long as the final judgment is
appealed. 321 In Texas Sting v. R.B. Foods, Inc., the San Antonio Court of
Appeals held that the appellant whose notice of appeal referenced the
date of a default judgment and not the date of a separate dismissal order
did not fail to perfect the appeal of the latter because "a final judgment
may consist of several orders that cumulatively dispose of all the parties
and issues." 322
E. PERFECTION IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Garza v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission32 3 involved the proce-
dures for perfecting an appeal from a Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commis-
sion (TABC) order denying a liquor license. Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Code section 11.67 provides that an appeal of a liquor license denial must
be tried to the district court within ten days after the appeal of the admin-
istrative order is filed with the district court.324 In Garza, the district
court conducted a hearing within the required ten days but did not sign a
judgment until nineteen days after the appeal was filed.325
The Texas Supreme Court held that section 11.67 requires that a judg-
ment must be rendered no later than ten days after the appeal is filed,
that a district court is not precluded from performing the ministerial act
of memorializing a timely rendition in a signed judgment after the ten-
day period, but that any judgment signed after the ten-day period that
316. Rodgers v. Mitchell, 83 S.W.3d 815, 817-18 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.)
(citing Baughman v. Baughman, 65 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied)).
317. In re Gary, No. 07-01-0466-CV, 2002 WL 1806800, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
Aug. 7, 2002, no pet.).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. TEX. R. App. P. 25.1(d)(2).
321. Texas Sting v. R.B. Foods, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 644, 648-49 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, pet. denied).
322. Id. at 648.
323. Garza v. TABC, 89 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2002).
324. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 11.67(b)(2) (Vernon 1995).
325. Garza, 89 S.W.3d at 2.
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differs from the timely rendition of judgment is void.326 In Garza, the
district court did not render judgment within the ten-day period.327 Thus,
the court concluded, judgment was rendered as a matter of law against
the party appealing the denial of the liquor license, and the district court
had a ministerial duty to sign a judgment affirming the TABC's denial.328
Appeals from a county court's ruling disposing of stolen property in the
state of Texas "shall be heard" by a court of appeals, and the appeal is
governed by the rules for civil appeals generally.32 9 However, Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 47.12 governs the procedures for the
county court hearing and mandates that a party who intends to appeal an
order of seizure must "give oral notice of appeal at the conclusion of the
hearing and must post an appeal bond by the end of the next business
day."'330 In Phillips v. State,33 1 the First Court of Appeals held that the
appellant did not timely perfect his appeal because he failed to give oral
notice and to post a bond as required by the criminal code.
F. SUPERSEDEAS BONDS
In Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew Professional Corp.,332 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals clarified that a trial court, either before or after its ple-
nary power expires, has the authority to review the sufficiency of the
sureties on a supersedeas bond without regard to whether the circum-
stances have changed since the trial court originally approved the bond.
VII. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
A. SEALING THE RECORD
Monsanto Co. v. Davis333 was an interlocutory appeal 334 from the trial
court's denial of a motion for protection and to seal a letter claimed to
have been inadvertently disclosed to opposing counsel. 335 Relying on
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3,336 the Waco Court of Appeals
entered a broad sealing order applicable to two appellate proceedings,
326. Id. at 6.
327. Id. at 7.
328. Id. at 9-10.
329. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 47.12(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2003).
330. Id. art. 47.12(c).
331. Phillips v. State, 77 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
332. Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew Prof'l Corp., 80 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2002, Rule 24.4 proceeding [leave denied]).
333. Monsanto Co. v. Davis., 2002 WL 31041838 (Tex. App.-Waco Sept. 11, 2002, no
pet.).
334. The opinion states that the appeal is interlocutory but does not explain how it hasjurisdiction over the interlocutory discovery issues on appeal.
335. Id.
336. TEx. R. App. P. 29.3. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 states: "When an
appeal from an interlocutory order is perfected, the appellate court may make any tempo-
rary orders necessary to preserve the parties' rights until disposition of the appeal and may
require appropriate security. But the appellate court must not suspend the trial court's
order if the appellant's rights would be adequately protected by supersedeas or another
order made under Rule 24."
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directing the clerk of the court of appeals to seal, during the pendency of
the appeal, the original and all copies of the letter in the appeal and in a
related mandamus proceeding. 337 The court of appeals reasoned that, if
the parties seeking the sealing order prevailed, "the fact that the docu-
ment in question has effectively remained open to public inspection
would significantly undermine the effectiveness of any relief to which
they may show themselves entitled." 338
B. FAILURE TO REQUEST THE RECORD
In Hiroms v. Scheffey, 339 a medical malpractice and negligent creden-
tialing case, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the appellants'
failure to request or file a reporter's record prevented the court of ap-
peals from addressing the merits of appellants' issue that the trial court
abused its discretion by submitting the Texas Pattern Jury Charges' defi-
nitions of "negligence ' 340 and "ordinary care" 341 in the court's charge.342
Without a reporter's record, the court of appeals determined that it could
not consider "the record as a whole" and the "evidence presented" to
determine whether appellants had met their burden to show error requir-
ing reversal. 343
C. SUPPLEMENTING THE RECORD
In Aguilar v. LVDVD, L.C.,3 4 4 an appeal from a summary judgment,
the appellee moved to supplement the record with a reporter's record of
the summary judgment hearing, arguing that it showed the trial court's
rulings on 23 objections to the appellants' summary judgment affida-
vits. 345 The appellants moved to strike the supplementation of the re-
cord,346 relying on City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority347 and
El Paso Associates, Ltd. v. J.R. Thurman & Co.348 for the proposition that
recording of summary judgment hearings is a practice "neither necessary
nor appropriate" to the purposes of a summary judgment hearing.349 The
El Paso Court of Appeals denied the motion to strike, holding that the
337. Davis, 2002 WL 31041838, at *1.
338. Id.
339. Hiroms v. Scheffey, 76 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).
340. Malpractice, Premises, Products, Texas Pattern Jury Charges, No. 50.1 (2000).
341. Hiroms, 76 S.W.3d at 488.
342. Id. at 488-89.
343. Id. (citing Melendez v. Exxon Corp., 998 S.W.2d 266, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Say. Ass'n,
710
S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh'g).
344. Aguilar v. LVDVD, L.C., 70 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied).
345. Id. at 916.
346. Id.
347. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979).
348. El Paso Assocs., Ltd. v. J.R. Thurman & Co., 786 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1990, no writ).
349. Aguilar, 70 S.W.3d at 916 (citing Clear Creek, 589 S.W.2d at 677) (citing Richards
v. Allen, 402 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex. 1966); TEx. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)).
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prohibition against oral testimony in Clear Creek,350 Thurman,351 and
Rule 166a(c) 352 does not limit the trial court's discretion to regulate attor-
ney argument at an oral hearing.353 Where, as here, the objections ruled
on at the hearing were presented to the trial court in writing,354 Rule
166a(c), 355 and Clear Creek356 allow a transcription of proceedings to en-
able the appellate court "to examine the transcript and determine
whether the issue was actually presented to and considered by the trial
judge. ' 357 The court also cited Appellate Procedure Rule 33358 as further
support for its ruling.359
D. THE SCOPE OF THE RECORD IN A PURA DIRECT APPEAL
In City Public Service Board of San Antonio v. Public Utility Commis-
sion of Texas,360 the Austin Court of Appeals noted the significant differ-
ences in the appellate record and the nature of appellate review between
direct appeals challenging the validity of a competition rule under the
Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act ("PURA") 36 1 and appeals challeng-
ing Public Utility Commission actions, which are brought and reviewed
under the substantial evidence rule.362 In a PURA direct appeal chal-
lenging the validity of competition rules, judicial review is limited to the
commission's rule-making record, which consists of: "(1) the notice of the
proposed rule; (2) the comments of all interested persons; (3) all studies,
reports, memoranda, or other materials on which the commission relied
in adopting the rule; and (4) the order adopting the rule. '363 By contrast,
other challenges to actions by the Commission, including rate orders, are
brought under the substantial evidence rule. 364 Review under the sub-
stantial evidence rule determines whether, on the basis of the record
350. Clear Creek, 589 S.W.2d at 673.
351. Thurman, 786 S.W.2d at 19.
352. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) provides in pertinent part that "No oral testimony shall be
received at the hearing."
353. Aguilar, 70 S.W.3d at 917 (citing Johnson v. Pumjani, 56 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) ("[A]ny oral hearing would be limited to attor-
ney argument, and regulation of argument lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court.")).
354. Id.
355. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) states in pertinent part that "[i]ssues not expressly
presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be con-
sidered on appeal as grounds for reversal."
356. Clear Creek, 589 S.W.2d at 677.
357. Aguilar, 70 S.W.3d at 917.
358. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that "[a]s a prerequisite to
presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that ... the trial court
ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly."
359. Aguilar, 70 S.W.3d at 917.
360. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 96 S.W.3d 355
(Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
361. Id. at 358 (citing TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.001(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
362. Id. at 360 (citing TEX. UaIL. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (Vernon 1998)).
363. Id. at 358 (quoting TEX. UTIL. CoDE ANN. § 39.001(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
364. Id. at 360 (citing TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (Vernon 1998) ("Any party to a
proceeding before the commission is entitled to judicial review under the substantial evi-
dence rule.")).
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before the agency, there was any reasonable basis for the challenged ac-
tions, 365 and the record in such an appeal would include:
(1) each pleading, motion, and intermediate ruling; (2) evidence re-
ceived or considered; (3) a statement of matters officially noticed; (4)
questions and offers of proof, objections, and rulings on them; (5)
proposed findings and exceptions; (6) each decision, opinion, or re-
port by the officer presiding at the hearing; and (7) all staff memo-
randa or data submitted to or considered by the hearing officer or
members of the agency who are involved in making the decision. 366
Because the suit was a purported challenge by direct appeal to the valid-
ity of a 1999 Rule, the court determined that it could only look to the
notice of the proposed rule, the comments of all interested persons, any
materials on which the Commission relied in adopting the rule, and the
order adopting the rule.367 The court could not review agency records
relating to challenged rate orders because the records of these orders and
proceedings would only be available in an appeal conducted under chap-
ter 2001 of the Government Code, not a direct appeal.368
E. THE SCOPE OF THE RECORD IN A SEVERED CAUSE
In New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Tobias,369 an appeal from a default judg-
ment in which the interlocutory default was made final by the entry of a
severance order, the Austin Court of Appeals held that "all documents
filed in a cause before a severance are part of the record of the severed
cause. '370 As a result, the court held that the clerk of the trial court must,
when properly requested, "place into the appellate record for the severed
cause relevant documents that were filed in the original cause before the
severance order."'371
VIII. WAIVER ON APPEAL
It is well established that grounds of error not asserted by points of
error or argument in the court of appeals are waived.372 The absence of
adequate briefing and argument will also result in waiver. 373 In the sum-
365. Id. at 361 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(e) (Vernon 2000) ("A court
shall conduct the review sitting without a jury and is confined to the agency record, except
that the court may receive evidence of procedural irregularities alleged to have occurred
before the agency that are not reflected in the record.")); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n of Tex., 947 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex. 1997).
366. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.060 (Vernon 2000).
367. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 96 S.W.3d at 361.
368. Id. at 360 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.060).
369. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Tobias, 80 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no
pet.).
370. Id. at 148 (citing Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Tex. 1995)).
371. Id. at 148-49.
372. See Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655-56 (Tex. 2001) (citing San Jacinto
River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209-10 (Tex. 1990)).
373. See Campbell v. State, 85 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. 2002) (concluding that a legal
sufficiency claim was not properly before the court because (1) petitioner's court of ap-
peals briefing did not challenge the evidence's legal sufficiency, and (2) while petitioner's
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mary judgment context, waiver results when an appellant uses specific
points of error or issues on appeal to attack a summary judgment and
fails to attack one of the possible grounds on which the judgment was
granted.374 In that instance, summary judgment must be affirmed.375
In Jacobs v. Satterwhite, the Texas Supreme Court found waiver where
the plaintiff failed to appeal every possible ground upon which the trial
court could have granted summary judgment. 376 In that case, the plaintiff
alleged claims of professional negligence and breach of contract.377 The
defendant moved for summary judgment on only the professional negli-
gence claim, but the trial court granted summary judgment on both
claims without stating the grounds for its ruling. 378 In the court of ap-
peals, the plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly granted sum-
mary judgment on the contract claim because the defendant's summary
judgment motion did not address that claim.379 However, the plaintiff
did not appeal the professional negligence claim.380 Th court of appeals
reversed summary judgment without distinguishing between the two
claims.381
On review to the supreme court, the supreme court concluded that the
plaintiff had waived his argument that summary judgment was improper
on the professional negligence claim by failing to raise it on appeal.382
Therefore, the court of appeals erred in reversing summary judgment be-
cause the unchallenged professional negligence claim provided an inde-
pendent basis for affirming the judgment. 38 3
Strather v. Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc.384 similarly involved an appel-
lant's failure to challenge all grounds upon which the trial court might
have granted summary judgment. In Strather, the defendant moved for
summary judgment on two grounds: defective parties and limitations. 385
The trial court's order granting summary judgment did not recite its rea-
sons; yet, Strather appealed only the defective parties issue. 386
Before deciding that Strather's failure to appeal limitations required
affirmance of the summary judgment, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
supreme court briefing contained a heading stating that evidence was legally insufficient,
the briefing did not discuss the appropriate standard, nor did it demonstrate why the evi-
dence did not support the trial court's judgment as a matter of law); but see Tex. State
Bank v. Amaro, 74 S.W.3d 392, 398 (Tex. 2002) (finding no waiver on appeal where party's
brief to the court of appeals made the objection at issue clear).
374. See Strather v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., 96 S.W.3d 420, 422-23 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2002, no pet.).
375. Id. at 423.





381. Id. at 654.
382. Id. at 655-56.
383. Id.
384. Strather, 96 S.W.3d at 423-25.
385. Id. at 421.
386. Id. at 421-22.
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noted a possible basis for finding no waiver. 387 Before the trial court had
ruled on the summary judgment motion, Strather had amended his peti-
tion to make it clear that his injury occurred within the limitations period,
which arguably removed limitations as a possible basis for the trial court's
summary judgment and relieved Strather from the duty of raising the is-
sue on appeal. 388 The court of appeals concluded, however, that the
amended pleading made no difference in the waiver analysis:
It is not uncommon.., for a party, in order to avoid summary judg-
ment, to amend his or her pleadings in response to a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Were we to remove Strather's burden of attacking
each of the possible grounds for granting summary judgment by sim-
ply referencing his amended pleadings and assuming the trial court
could not have granted summary judgment in light of those amended
pleadings, we would effectively be placing ourselves in the role of the
trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.389
The court therefore "decline[d] to set such a precedent, especially be-
cause the burden of attacking each possible ground alleged in the sum-
mary judgment motion is relatively light. '390
IX. SPECIAL APPEALS
A. RESTRICTED APPEALS
A restricted appeal is a direct attack on the judgment of the trial
court. 39t As provided by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30:
A party who did not participate-either in person or through coun-
sel-in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and
who did not timely file a postjudgment motion or request for findings
of fact and conclusions of law, or a notice of appeal within the time
permitted by Rule 26.1(a), may file a notice of appeal within the time
permitted by Rule 26.1(C). 392
Under Rule 26.1(c), the notice of restricted appeal must be filed within
six months after the trial court signed the judgment or order. 393 The re-
quirements of Rule 26.1(c) and Rule 30 "are jurisdictional and will cut off
a party's right to seek relief by way of a restricted appeal if they are not




391. TEX. R. App. P. 30.
392. TEX. R. App. P. 30. Rule 30 also provides that restricted appeals "replace writ of
error appeals to the court of appeals" and that "[sitatutes pertaining to writ of error ap-
peals to the court of appeals apply equally to restricted appeals." Id. "The restricted ap-
peal replaced the former writ of error practice when the supreme court adopted the
current appellate rules in 1997." Campbell v. Fincher, 72 S.W.3d 723, 724 (Tex. App.-
Waco 2002, no pet.); Taylor v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.);
TEX. R. App. P. 30 cmt.
393. Clopton v. Pak, 66 S.W.3d 513, 515 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied);
Seeley v. KCI USA, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 276, 277 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
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met. ' 394 The six-month period under Rule 26.1(c) begins to run the day
after the judgment or order is signed; the day the order is signed is not
included in calculating the deadline for the notice of appeal. 395
Further, participation "through counsel" includes a situation where ap-
pellant's counsel agrees to the dispositive order or judgment, even if
neither the appellant nor his attorney actually attended the hearing that
resulted in the disposition order or judgment.396 A restricted appeal "is
not available to give a party who suffers an adverse judgment at its own
hands another opportunity to have the merits of the case reviewed. '397
The question under Rule 30 is whether appellant "participated in the 'de-
cision-making event' that resulted in the order adjudicating appellant[s]
rights. '398 The agreement by an appellant's attorney to the order adjudi-
cating appellant's rights constitutes participation "through counsel"
under Rule 30, even if neither appellant nor his counsel attended the
hearing preceding the order.
While the scope of review in a restricted appeal has been called "pecu-
liar,"'399 the review is the same as an ordinary appeal, that is, a review of
the entire case. 400 "A review of the entire case includes a review of legal
and factual sufficiency claims. 40' The error complained of, however,
"must appear on the face of the record. '40 2 The "face of the record," for
purposes of a restricted appeal, "consists of all the papers on file in the
appeal, including the reporter's record. '40 3
The absence of any evidence to support at least one element of each of
the plaintiff's causes of action "constitutes error apparent on the face of
the record. ' 40 4 In contrast, error is not "apparent on the face of the re-
cord" where an appellant seeks to reverse a judgment appearing valid on
the face of the record because of something occurring after the judgment
was rendered (for example, the failure of the clerk to send notice of the
judgment). 40 5 To permit an appellant to succeed on such an issue "would
be rewarding him for not appearing or participating, for whatever reason,
in the trial proceeding. ' 40 6 The appellant's remedy under these circum-
stances is to seek a bill of review, not a restricted appeal. 407
394. Clopton, 66 S.W.3d at 515.
395. Id. at 515-16; TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1(a).
396. Clopton, 66 S.W.3d at 516.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d at 96.
400. Id. (quoting Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1965)); Clopton, 66
S.W.3d at 516; O'Neal v. O'Neal, 69 S.W.3d 347, 348 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.).
401. Sutton v. Hisaw & Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 281, 284 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
402. O'Neal, 69 S.W.3d at 348; Taylor, 63 S.W.3d at 96; Clopton, 66 S.W.3d at 516.
403. O'Neal, 69 S.W.3d at 348.
404. Sutton, 65 S.W.3d at 286.
405. Campbell, 72 S.W.3d at 724-25.
406. Id.
407. Id.; accord Jackson v. Gutierrez, 77 S.W.3d 898, 901 n.2 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
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B. BILL OF REVIEW
"A bill of review is an equitable proceeding by a party to a former
action who seeks to set aside a judgment that is no longer appealable or
subject to challenge by a motion for new trial. ' 408 Like a restricted ap-
peal, a bill of review is a "direct attack on a judgment. '40 9 However,
unlike a restricted appeal, a bill of review is considered not by the court
of appeals, but by the same trial court that rendered the judgment under
attack.410 "The requirement that a bill of review be filed in the same
court that rendered the judgment under attack is a matter of jurisdic-
tion., 411 Relief by bill of review is available "only if a party has exercised
due diligence in pursuing all adequate legal remedies. ' 412 Accordingly, if
legal remedies were available but ignored, "relief by bill of review is un-
available. '413 This is true, "even if the failure to pursue remedies was the
result of the negligence or mistake" of a party's attorney.414
While a bill of review is an equitable proceeding, the fact that an injus-
tice has occurred "is not sufficient to justify relief by bill of review. '415
This is so because it is "fundamentally important that some finality be
accorded to judgments." Accordingly, a bill of review seeking relief from
an otherwise final judgment "is scrutinized by the courts 'with extreme
jealousy, and the grounds on which interference will be allowed are nar-
row and restricted.' "416
The complainant in a bill of review proceeding must normally demon-
strate that she:
(1) has a meritorious defense to the claim alleged to support the
judgment, (2) was prevented from making that defense because of
the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, and (3)
was not at fault or negligent.417
However, "a judgment entered in the absence of service of process and
with substantial adverse consequences to the party in default is a viola-
tion of due process, and may be set aside without any showing of merito-
rious cause. '418
408. Jones v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 85 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
409. Richards v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 81 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.-




413. Id.; Garcia v. Tenorio, 69 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet.
denied).




418. In re Ham, 59 S.W.3d 326, 331 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
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C. DIRECT APPEALS TO THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
The Texas Supreme Court has jurisdiction over direct appeals from "an
order of a trial court granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent
injunction on the ground of the constitutionality of a [Texas] statute. '419
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court found in Hodges
that it had direct appeal jurisdiction over the trial court's judgment in
which the court declared section 162.015 of the Texas Election Code un-
constitutional as applied to the appellee (a Democratic Party judicial can-
didate) and permanently enjoined the Democratic Party from declaring
the appellee ineligible for a place on the general election ballot. 420 The
supreme court also found that it had "extended jurisdiction" over the ap-
pellee's cross-point challenging the statutory construction of section
162.015. As the supreme court explained, "when this Court has appellate
jurisdiction over any issue, it acquires 'extended jurisdiction' over all
other questions of law properly preserved and presented." 421
On direct appeal, the supreme court's review is confined to questions




Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45, appellate courts are au-
thorized to award "just damages" to a prevailing party if the court deter-
mines an appeal is frivolous. While bad faith is not required, dispositive,
or even material in deciding whether an appeal is frivolous, "the presence
of bad faith could be relevant in determining the amount of the sanc-
tion. '423 In applying Rule 45, the court of appeals must "exercise pru-
dence and caution and use careful deliberation . . . objectively
determining whether an appeal is frivolous. '424 The court looks at the
record "from the viewpoint of the advocate," deciding whether "he had
reasonable grounds to believe the case could be reversed. '425 While the
right to appeal is a "most sacred and valuable one," the court stated:
We will not permit spurious appeals, which unnecessarily burden
parties and our already crowded docket, to go unpunished. Such ap-
peals take the court's attention from appeals filed in good faith,
419. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-
b. See State v. Hodges, 92 S.W.3d 489, 490 (Tex. 2002).
420. Hodges, 92 S.W.3d at 490. The Democratic Party argued that the appellee was
disqualified as a nominee for the Democratic Party because he had voted in the Republi-
can Party primary. Id. at 489.
421. Id.
422. Id. In Hodges, the supreme court ultimately concluded that the statute was not
unconstitutional as applied to the appellee judicial candidate, reversed the trial court's
judgment, and rendered judgment that the appellee was ineligible for a place on the gen-
eral election ballot as a judicial candidate for the Democratic Party. Id. at 502.
423. Malone v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols & Friend, No. 01-99-01192-CV, 2002 WL
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wasting court time that could and should be devoted to those ap-
peals. No litigant has the right to put a party to needless burden and
expense or to waste the court's time that would otherwise be spent
on the sacred task of adjudicating the valid disputes of Texas
citizens. 426
Although these standards are not easily met, the First Court of Appeals
had no problem granting appellate sanctions in Malone, where counsel
for appellants had filed eighty-nine, separate lawsuits against appellees in
retaliation for counsel's loss of an earlier case involving the division of
attorney's fees, the eighty-nine lawsuits were filed in bad faith and for the
purposes of harassment, and the lawsuits were frivolous (asserting claims
for which appellants had no standing and which were not cognizable
under Texas law). Concluding that the appeal was objectively frivolous,
warranting the assessment of appellate sanctions, the court of appeals
stated: "[O]ur system of justice should not allow everybody to sue every-
body else for everything. This case presents some good examples of
claims we should not allow. '427
XI. APPELLATE. REMEDIES
The court of appeals' judgment should conform to its analysis in its
opinion. 428 When it does not, the supreme court may remand the claims
at issue to the court of appeals with instructions to resolve the conflict
between the court of appeals' reasoning and its judgment.429
When the supreme court announces a new proposition of law that pro-
vides a possible basis for recovery that did not exist at the time of trial,
the appropriate remedy on appeal is a remand for an evidentiary hearing
or new trial, as appropriate. 430 Generally, such a remand is warranted as
being "in the interest of justice" under Rules 43.3 and 60.3 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Similarly, such a remand is justified when the supreme court bases its
decision on the fact that it has never considered how a particular claim
should be submitted to the jury and the law regarding the submission at
issue had, prior to its decision, remained unclear.431 When, however, a
question submitted to the jury is immaterial, rendition, not remand, is
426. Id. at *9 (quoting Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 79 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ denied)).
427. Id. (quoting Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 81); compare Brazos Transit Dist. v. Lozano, 72
S.W.3d 442, 445 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.) (appellate sanctions not warranted
where appellant's arguments had some support); Clopton v. Pak, 66 S.W.3d 513, 517 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (appellate sanctions not warranted where appellant
pursued restricted appeal and issue of "participation" was unclear under available case
law).
428. TEX. R. App. P. 47.1.
429. TEX. R. App. P. 59.1, 60.2(d); Texas Assoc. of Sch. Boards, Inc. v. Bass, 92 S.W.3d
488, 489 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
430. Utts v. Short, 81 S.W.3d 822, 830 (Tex. 2002). The usual basis for such a remand is
TEX. R. App. P. 60.3, although not expressly cited to the court in Utts.
431. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 840-41 (Tex. 2000).
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appropriate. A question to the jury is rendered immaterial when one
party fails to include, over objection, the essential elements of a claim.
Under these circumstances, the proper remedy on appeal is rendition of
judgment.432
As the Tyler Court of Appeals concluded in LaGloria Oil & Gas Co. v.
Carboline Co., however, other factors may alter the remedy on appeal. 433
In that case, the jury question on defendants' limitations defense omitted
an essential element. Recognizing that normally the proper appellate
remedy would be to render judgment, the court nonetheless remanded
for a new trial on both liability and limitations. 434 The trial court had
held a separate trial on limitations prior to a finding on liability, which
the court of appeals concluded caused great potential for confusion on
appeal and possibly resulted in confusion in the court below as to
whether the omitted element was appropriate for the issue submitted to
the jury. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that remand for
a new trial was appropriate.435
XII. MOOT APPEALS
The rule in Texas has been that a debtor's voluntary payment and satis-
faction of an adverse judgment moots the controversy, waives the
debtor's right to appeal, and requires dismissal of the case.436 The reason
for this rule is to prevent a party who freely decides to pay a judgment
from changing his mind and pursuing recovery of the payment with the
court's aid. "A party should not be allowed to mislead his opponent into
believing that the controversy is over and then contest the payment and
seek recovery. '437
This rule was recently "clarified" by the Texas Supreme Court in Miga
v. Jensen438 to include circumstances in which the judgment is "involunta-
rily" paid because the judgment debtor feels "anxious" about the accrual
of post-judgment interest. In Miga, the supreme court argued that the
payment rule is not that any payment toward satisfying a judgment, in-
cluding a voluntary payment, moots the controversy and waives the right
to appeal the judgment. Rather, payment does not moot the judgment
debtor's appeal when the payment is made under "economic duress,"
which, the court decided, includes duress implied by the accrual of post-
judgment interest. 439 Accordingly, where the appellant is "justifiably
anxious to avoid the ... interest which would accrue while the case was
432. Id. at 839.




436. Highland Church of Christ v. Powell, 640 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1982).
437. Id.; see Riner v. Briargrove Park Prop. Owners, Inc., 858 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1993)
(per curiam).
438. Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. 2002).
439. Id. at 211.
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on appeal," payment of the judgment does not moot the appeal.440 The
majority reasoned that "[o]ne must be able to halt the accrual of post-
judgment interest, yet still preserve appellate rights. ' 441 Such a party
"should be able to decide without fear of a Hobson's choice-that is, that
the party might presumptively waive its appellate prospects. ' '442
The majority cautioned, however, that the party's intention to appeal
the judgment must be clear. A party should not be allowed "to simply
change his mind about pursuing the case or mislead his opponent into
thinking the controversy is over. '443 The "safe practice" when paying the
judgment is for the party to explicitly reserve his right to appeal on the
record. 444 Payment on a judgment, therefore, "will not moot an appeal of
that judgment if the judgment debtor clearly expresses an intent that he
intends to exercise his right of appeal and appellate relief is not futile. '445
Calling the majority's holding "a significant departure from the Texas
rule," the dissent argued that "involuntary payment" under Texas law oc-
curs only in situations where the judgment debtor is faced with duress in
the nature of losing his property through execution of the judgment, as
opposed to merely facing the accrual of a higher interest rate on the judg-
ment than would accrue on (for example) Treasury Bonds posted to se-
cure a supersedeas bond.446 Texas law, the dissent explained, assumes
that a party's payment of the judgment is voluntary and does moot the
appeal, unless the judgment debtor demonstrates that the payment was
involuntary (as defined under Texas law). In direct opposition, the fed-
eral approach assumes that a party's paying the judgment does not moot
the appeal, "unless payment is by way of compromise or shows an inten-
tion to abide by the judgment, payment is coupled with the acceptance of
benefits under the judgment, or compliance with the judgment renders
appellate relief futile. '447 Under the majority's holding, the dissent con-
cluded, the Texas presumption that the appeal is moot unless the judg-
ment debtor proves the payment was involuntary "no longer applies."
"[A]fter today, a Texas judgment debtor need only show an intent to ap-
peal ... to preserve appellate rights." 448
XIII. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court granted review in
numerous cases to resolve conflicts among the appellate courts as to the




443. Id. at 212.
444. Id. The court added that making such a reservation does not make the payment
conditional. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 224-27 (Schneider, J., dissenting).




proved the application of the abuse of discretion standard in several in-
stances, including in review of personal jurisdiction rulings and rulings on
primary jurisdiction. In another landmark decision, the supreme court
adopted a "firm belief or conviction" standard of review in cases involv-
ing termination of parental rights.
A. REVIEW OF RULINGS ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court resolved a longstand-
ing dispute among appellate courts as to the proper standard of review of
an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on personal jurisdiction.449 As the
supreme court noted, the San Antonio Court of Appeals has consistently
reviewed rulings on special appearance for an abuse of discretion while
most courts review such rulings under a sufficiency of the evidence stan-
dard.450 The supreme court held that in the special appearance context,
the trial court's factual findings shbuld be reviewed for legal and factual
sufficiency while conclusions of law should be reviewed de novo.451 The
supreme court expressly disapproved "of those cases applying an abuse of
discretion standard only. '452
B. REVIEW OF RULINGS ON EXCLUSIVE AND PRIMARY JURISDICTION
The supreme court also rejected the abuse of discretion standard in
reviewing a ruling on the question of primary jurisdiction.453 In Subaru
of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.,454 the Texas Supreme
Court acknowledged that a question of exclusive jurisdiction is a question
of law which must be reviewed de novo.455 The supreme court further
resolved an open question regarding the proper standard of review for a
trial court's grant or denial of a motion for dismissal or abatement based
on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The supreme court concluded that
primary jurisdiction often requires an analysis of statutory construc-
tion.456 Because statutory construction matters are generally questions of
law, primary jurisdiction issues are also questions of law, which are re-
viewed de novo. 457
449. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793-94 (Tex. 2002).
450. See Id. (citing Klenk v. Bustamante, 993 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1998, no pet.)). But see Lonza AG v. Blum, 70 S.W.3d 184, 1$8-89 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard of review
where the trial court entered findings of fact).
451. See BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794.
452. Id.
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C. REVIEW IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES UNDER
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD
In In re C.H.,458 the supreme court resolved a conflict among Texas
appellate courts on the standard of review in cases involving the termina-
tion of parental rights. Section 161.001(1), (2) of the Family Code pro-
vides that a court may only terminate the parent-child relationship if the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent has en-
gaged in certain listed acts and (2) "termination is in the best interest of
the child."'459
Texas appellate courts have split on whether the "clear and convincing
evidence" requirement under section 161 of the Family Code requires ap-
plication of a traditional sufficiency of the evidence standard of review or
some intermediate or heightened standard of review. 460 Reasoning that
"the burden of proof at trial necessarily affects appellate review of the
evidence," the supreme court adopted a new standard of review for ter-
mination findings, to wit, "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder
could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the
State's allegations. ' 461 In adopting this standard, the supreme court dis-
approved of opinions applying a factual sufficiency standard, highly prob-
able standard, or any other standard that is inconsistent with the court's
announced standard. 462 The supreme court also imposed a duty on the
appellate court to clearly explain why "it concluded a reasonable jury
could not form a firm conviction or belief from all the evidence" that
termination would be in the best interest of the child.463
Applying the newly-articulated standard of review, the supreme court
admonished the court of appeals for disregarding evidence that the jury
presumably considered clear and convincing in concluding that there was
not factually sufficient evidence to terminate the parental rights of a fa-
ther who had been in prison for years and had taken no steps to care for
or participate in his child's life. 464
D. REVIEW OF RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AFTER
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp.,465 the Texas Supreme
Court resolved yet another conflict among the appellate courts on the
proper standard of review, this time addressing the question of whether
458. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002).
459. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §161.001(1), (2) (Vernon 2002).
460. CH., 89 S.W.3d at 19.
461. Id. The court based its reasoning on the fact that the clear and convincing stan-
dard is "constitutionally-mandated." Id. The concurrence recognized that until the United
States Supreme Court requires independent appellate review in parental termination cases
(as is currently required in cases of punitive damages and defamation claims), the court
would not sanction a de novo review. Id. at 22 (Hecht, J., concurring).
462. Id.
463. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 22.
464. Id. at 21. See also In re N.K., 89 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
465. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. 2002).
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the equitable standard under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines,466 for set-
ting aside a default judgment, should also apply to review of a motion for
new trial after summary judgment is granted when the nonmovant failed
to timely respond.467 The supreme court held that Craddock "does not
apply to a motion for new trial filed after summary judgment is granted
on a motion to which the nonmovant failed to timely respond when the
respondent had notice of the hearing and an opportunity to employ the
means" available under the rules of procedure to alter the deadlines im-
posed under Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.468 The
supreme court reasoned that Craddock should be limited to instances
where the party did not learn of the scheduled event until the motion for
new trial stage. 469 The standard should not apply where the rules provide
for appellate relief, such as with a motion for leave to file untimely sum-
mary judgment evidence. 470
However, as noted by the concurrence, the new standard (good cause)
adopted by the court to review a motion for leave to file late-filed sum-
mary judgment evidence is only marginally different from Craddock.471
To show good cause, the nonmovant must show (1) that the failure to
timely respond was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference,
but the result of an accident or mistake, and (2) that allowing the late
response will occasion no undue delay or otherwise injure the party seek-
ing summary judgment.472
Notably, this standard is less onerous than Craddock because it elimi-
nates the requirement that the party show a meritorious response to the
summary judgment motion. Otherwise, the standard is the same.
E. DEEMED FINDINGS ON APPEAL
Rule 279 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure permits the trial
court "to make and file written findings" on an omitted element of a
claim when requested to do so by a party and where there is factually
sufficient evidence to support such a finding.473 Where no such written
findings are made, an omitted element can be deemed found by the court
466. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939). Under Craddock, a
default judgment can be set aside when the defendant establishes (1) the failure to answer
was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of an accident or
mistake, (2) the motion for new trial sets up a meritorious defense, and (3) granting the
motion will occasion no undue delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff. Id. at 126.
467. Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 683-85.
468. Id. at 684.
469. Id. at 685.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 689 (Hecht, J., concurring).
472. Id. at 685, 688. The concurrence would offer a slightly different standard, requir-
ing a new trial upon (1) a showing that the failure to respond was not intentional or due to
conscious indifference, but rather, was due to accident or mistake; (2) production of suffi-
cient summary judgment evidence to raise a material fact issue; and (3) a showing that
granting a new trial will occasion no delay or otherwise injure the opposing party. Id. at
689 (Hecht, J., concurring).
473. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 279.
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"in such a manner as to support the judgment. ' 474 In Gulf States Utility
Co. v. Low,4 7 5 the Texas Supreme Court held that in cases where a party
does not secure a finding on a deemed element of a claim in the trial
court, Rule 279 "provides for deemed findings only as a basis for af-
firming the trial court's judgment. '476 In Low, a plaintiff complaining
that his utility company unlawfully terminated his electricity obtained
favorable findings on claims of negligence and violations of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, damages (including past mental anguish), and attor-
neys' fees.477 The trial court entered a judgment for $12,100, but did not
award attorneys' fees.478 On appeal, the court of appeals modified the
judgment based on a deemed finding that the utility company knowingly
engaged in unconscionable conduct to include an award of mental
anguish damages. 479 The supreme court concluded that Rule 279 did not
permit the court of appeals to make deemed findings to enlarge the judg-
ment.480 Rather, because Low did not ask the trial court to make
deemed findings, the court of appeals could only make deemed findings
consistent with the judgment.481
474. Id.
475. Gulf States Util. Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 564-66 (Tex. 2002).
476. Id. at 565.
477. Id. at 563.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Low, 79 S.W.3d at 563.
481. Id.
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